Professor at CEMFI
ICREA Research Professor at MOVE (on leave)
Adjunct Faculty, Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (on leave)
Research Professor, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (on leave)
European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant Holder, 2010-2015.
I am a Managing Editor of Economic Journal, and an Associate Editor of Journal of Demographic Economics and SERIEs (the Journal of the Spanish Economic Association)
In 2018, I am serving as the President of the Spanish Economic Association.
Phone: 34-91-429 4017 E-mail: email@example.com
Child-Related Transfers, Household Labor Supply and Welfare (with Remzi Kaygusuz and Gustavo Ventura), new version
What are the macroeconomic effects of transfers to households with children in the United States? How do alternative policies fare in welfare terms? We answer these questions in an equilibrium life-cycle model with household labor supply decisions, skill losses of females associated to non participation, and heterogeneity in terms of fertility, childcare expenditures and access to informal care. We contrast transfers that are contingent on market work (childcare subsidies and childcare credits) with those that are not (child credits), and evaluate reallocation of resources across programs as well as expansions of them. We find that expansions of transfers of the first group have substantial positive effects on female labor supply, which are largest at the bottom of the skill distribution. Expanding childcare credits leads to long-run increases in the participation of married females of 10.6%. An equivalent expansion of the child credits leads to the opposite, a reduction of about 2.4%. The expansion of existing programs generates substantial welfare gains for newborn households, which are largest for less-skilled households. Expanding childcare credits leads to the largest gains in labor supply and welfare and achieves majority support among newborn households.
Is Marriage for White People? Incarceration and the Racial Marriage Divide (Elizabeth Caucutt and Christopher Rauh), new version
The black-white differences in marriages in the US are striking. While 83% of white women between ages 25 and 54 were ever married in 2006, only 56% of black women were: a gap of 27 percentage points. Wilson (1987) suggests that the lack of marriageable black men due to incarceration and unemployment is responsible for low marriage rates among the black population. In this paper, we take a dynamic look at the Wilson Hypothesis. We argue that the current incarceration policies and labor market prospects make black men riskier spouses than white men. They are not only more likely to be, but also to become, unemployed or incarcerated than their white counterparts. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce and labor supply that takes into account the transitions between employment, unemployment and prison for individuals by race, education, and gender. We estimate model parameters to be consistent with key statistics of the US economy. We then investigate how much of the racial divide in marriage is due to differences in the riskiness of potential spouses. We find that differences in incarceration and employment dynamics between black and white men can account for half of the existing black-white marriage gap in the data.
Optimal Spatial Taxation: Are Big Cities Too Small? (with Jan Eeckhout)
We analyze the role of optimal income taxation across different local labor markets. Should labor in large cities be taxed differently than in small cities? We find that a planner who needs to raise a given level of revenue and is constrained by free mobility of labor across cities does not choose equal taxes for cities of different sizes. The optimal tax schedule is location specific and tax differences between large and small cities depends on the level of government spending, the concentration of housing wealth and the strength of agglomeration economies. Our estimates for the US imply higher optimal marginal rates in big cities than in small cites. Under the current Federal Income tax code with progressive taxes, marginal rates are already higher in big cities which have higher wages, but the optimal difference we estimate is lower than what is currently observed. Simulating the US economy under the optimal tax schedule, there are large effects on population mobility: the fraction of population in the 5 largest cities grows by 7.6% with 3.4% of the country-wide population moving to bigger cities. The welfare gains however are smaller. This is due to the fact that much of the output gains are spent on the increased costs of housing construction in bigger cities. Aggregate goods consumption goes up by 1.51% while aggregate housing consumption goes down by 1.70%.
Marriage and Health: Selection, Protection and Assortative Mating (with Yuliya Kulikova and Joan Llull), European Economic Review, 104, 138–166, May 2018 (Reprinted for the Special Issue on "Gender Differences in the Labor Market", European Economic Reivew, 109, 162-190, October 2018) (previously titled as "Does Marriage Make You Healthier?")
Managers and Productivity Differences (with Andrii Parkhomenko and Gustavo Ventura), Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol 29, July 2018, 256-282
Family Economics Writ Large (with Jeremy Greenwood and Guillaume Vandenbroucke), Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 55, December 2017, 1346-1434.