Breaking the Feedback Loop: 
Macroprudential Regulation of 
Banks’ Sovereign Exposures*

Jorge Abad
CEMFI
February 2019
(Preliminary)

Click here for the latest version or go to:
http://www.cemfi.es/~abad/research.html

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model which features both endogenous bank failure and sovereign default risk to study the feedback loop between sovereign and banking crises. In the model, an initial shock to the banking sector contributes to an increase in public debt and sovereign risk as a result of the government bailout of failed banks. Holding high-yield, risky sovereign bonds may be attractive for surviving banks protected by limited liability, resulting in excessive exposure of banks to sovereign risk. By increasing banks’ failure risk and their funding costs, this exposure represents an important source of systemic spillovers, with negative effects on financial stability and economic activity. Tightening the treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures in regulatory capital requirements can help mitigating the negative aggregate effects of the feedback loop. The results, however, also point out to the existence of non-trivial welfare trade-offs when setting the optimal regulation.

Keywords: feedback loop, financial crises, sovereign default, macroprudential policy, systemic risk, capital requirements.

JEL codes: E44, F34, G01, G21, G28

1 Introduction

The negative feedback loop between banks, sovereigns and aggregate economic activity has drawn considerable attention since the onset of the European debt crisis.\footnote{Lane (2012) provides a narrative of the European sovereign debt crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Balteanu and Erce (2017) document the recurrent link between sovereign and banking crises using long historical time series for a wide range of countries.} In a nutshell, the loop refers to the fact that governments’ support to banks puts pressure on government finances when the financial health of banks deteriorates, while the elevated exposure of banks’ to domestic sovereign debt translates the weakness of public finances into further weakness for banks. In parallel, the negative effect of bank distress on economic activity causes further damage to sovereigns (via their budget) and banks (via profits).

In this context, several voices called for changes in the regulatory treatment of banks’ exposure to (domestic) sovereign debt.\footnote{See for example Gros (2013), Weidmann (2013), Enria, Farkas and Overby (2016), and BIS (2016).} Existing capital regulation imposes that at least a fraction of the banks’ risk-weighted assets has to be financed with bank equity capital. However, as of now, it assigns zero risk weights to domestic sovereign debt. Furthermore, domestic government debt holdings are exempt from existing concentration limits to single counterparties, and are even encouraged by current liquidity regulation.\footnote{Nouy (2012) provides a comprehensive review of the current regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures for banks and insurance companies.}

In a report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures in the books of banks and insurance companies, the European Systemic Risk Board stated: “If sovereign exposures are in fact subject to default risk, consistency with a risk-focused approach to prudential regulation and supervision requires that this default risk is taken into account” (ESRB, 2015).

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model that captures the loop and the key elements of the policy discussion. The model focuses on the interplay between endogenous bank failure risk and sovereign default risk. Government bailout guarantees on bank liabilities and banks’ exposures to risky sovereign debt can give rise to a negative feedback loop between sovereign risk and financial instability, with important contractionary effects on economic activity. The model allows to perform counterfactual exercises regarding modifications of the current regulatory treatment of banks’ exposure to sovereign risk. This paper assesses, in particular, the macroprudential implications of introducing regulatory capital requirements on banks’ sovereign debt holdings.

In the model, bank failure risk stems from the exposure to risky private sector assets, as well as to defaultable sovereign debt. Distortions arising from banks’ limited liability make investing in high-yield, risky sovereign debt attractive for banks, whose shareholders can enjoy high profits insofar as the government does not default and suffer losses limited to their initial equity contributions.
otherwise. These risk-shifting incentives result in excessive exposure to sovereign risk.

Government bailout guarantees on bank liabilities in the model take the form of deposit insurance. Yet, the possibility that the government defaults on its deposit insurance liabilities if sovereign risk materializes makes the cost of bank funding increasing in banks’ exposure to the risky sovereign.\footnote{Màkinen, Sarno and Zinna (2018) provide evidence on the quantitative relevance of this channel.} The pricing of bank liabilities on the basis of the average expected default risk (without linking the required interest rate to variation in the holdings of sovereign debt by an individual bank) feeds excessive risk taking by banks.

The link between bank risk and sovereign risk acts as an important source of systemic spillovers: an initial shock to a small fraction of banks can damage the sovereign and translate into higher risk taking, higher bank funding costs, and system-wide instability. By disrupting banks’ intermediation, the effects of the feedback loop have dramatic consequences for economic activity, even when the sovereign default event does not materialize. Thus, the model environment provides a macroprudential rationale for policies aimed to reduce banks’ incentives to excessively expose themselves to sovereign risk.

The model is relatively parsimonious, compared to other dynamic general equilibrium models in the literature. The reason for this is twofold. First, keeping the model simple by abstracting from a number of features (labor market frictions, nominal frictions, monetary policy) allows to isolate the key mechanisms behind the feedback loop and to understand the effects of changes in the regulatory environment. Second, the need to use computationally intensive global solution methods restricts the size of the models that can be feasibly solved, since numerical approximation procedures in high-dimensional spaces can easily suffer from the so called curse of dimensionality.\footnote{In order to overcome these problems, state of the art computational techniques are used. Maliar and Maliar (2014) and Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016) provide a comprehensive survey of those techniques. Further details are provided in the Appendix.} In spite of this, the model is rich enough to capture and quantify many of the elements analyzed in the theoretical literature about the feedback loop and documented in recent empirical work, and to provide novel insights about the implications of modifying the current regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures.

The model is calibrated to match a set of empirical targets that allow to quantitatively capture the dynamics of a number of aggregate variables around the events of the European sovereign debt crisis. The quantitative results reveal important amplification effects resulting from the presence of the feedback loop, which could be partially mitigated by amending existing capital regulation with the introduction of positive risk weights on sovereign exposures.
Under the proposed calibration of the model (intended to represent an European economy with medium-to-high sovereign risk), for a given capital requirement of 8%, social welfare would be maximized by setting a 40% risk weight on sovereign exposures. The results identify non-trivial welfare trade-offs regarding the proposed regulatory reform. Specifically, higher government borrowing costs and the contraction in credit supply offset the potential benefits of further increasing the risk weight for sovereign exposures beyond a certain point.

The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how the paper relates to the existing literature. Section 3 describes the model setup. Section 4 describes the calibration, introduces the numerical solution method, and the main quantitative properties of the model. Section 5 provides the results of a counterfactual exercise about the potential effects of introducing a positive risk weight for sovereign debt in the calculations of the regulatory capital requirements. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix provides data sources, the complete set of equilibrium equations, a detailed description of the numerical solution method, and an assessment of its accuracy.

2 Related literature

This paper connects with several strands of the literature on the relationship between bank and sovereign crises, as well as with the literature on macro-financial linkages.

A number of recent papers have documented and provided reasons for banks’ tendency to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign debt during times of sovereign distress. For authors such as Broner, Erce, Martin and Ventura (2014), creditor discrimination by defaulting governments may create a difference between the expected return on sovereign bonds for domestic banks and foreign investors. This difference increases during times of stress, which leads to a re-nationalization of domestic sovereign debt. A second strand in this literature attributes bank behavior to the effect of moral suasion (see Acharya and Rajan, 2013, and Chari, Dovis and Kehoe, 2014, for theoretical models reflecting this channel, and Becker and Ivashina, 2017, Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli, 2017, and Ongena, Popov and Van Horen, 2018, for related evidence in the context of the European debt crisis). In a third strand, banks’ incentive to keep excessive holdings of sovereign debt comes from standard limited liability distortions, as analyzed in a theoretical setup by Ari (2017). This risk shifting behavior has been documented by Acharya and Steffen (2015) and Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli (2017), and plays a key role in this analysis.

Previous literature has analyzed the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns in stylized theoretical models. Acharya, Dreschsler and Schnabl (2014) analyze the potentially self-defeating consequences of bank bailouts in a model in which increased sovereign credit risk erodes
the value of government guarantees and bond holdings in banks’ balance sheets. Cooper and Nikolov (2018) develop a model in which self-fulfilling expectations about bank bailouts and sovereign default give rise to a ‘diabolic loop’.6 The paper highlights the role of bank equity for banks’ risk-taking incentives. Farhi and Tirole (2018) emphasize the international dimension of the feedback loop and the incentives for the re-nationalization of sovereign debt during stress episodes. In their model, as in Uhlig (2014), and as long as the cost of bailouts can be shifted to international lenders, domestic supervisors have incentives to allow banks’ risk taking in order to relax the borrowing costs of the government.

Papers in this strand of the literature shed light on the mechanisms behind the feedback loop, but do not speak about dynamic general equilibrium effects and therefore are not entirely suitable for quantitative analysis. The quantitative route is followed by a number of recent papers centered on the impact of sovereign risk on the banking sector (one of the sides of the loop). Bocola (2016) analyzes the pass-through of sovereign risk to the banking sector in an environment in which sovereign risk shocks are exogenous and the banking sector is modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and thus abstracts from limited liability, the possibility of bank failure and banks’ risk-shifting incentives. Faia (2017) considers the effect of banks’ exposure to sovereign risk on bank funding costs and, through this channel, on economic activity. These papers, by either modeling sovereign risk as exogenous or by abstracting from the possibility of bailouts (or both), do not capture the potential feedback effects of bank failure risk on sovereign default. The contribution of this paper is thus to explicitly consider the macroeconomic consequences of the two-way feedback loop between sovereign and bank risk, and to analyze of the role of capital requirements for banks’ sovereign exposures in mitigating these effects.

Methodologically, this paper relates to recent efforts to solve quantitative models of financial crises using global solution methods.7 These papers highlight the importance of non-linear dynamics and risk premia variation, which traditional local solution methods are not able to capture and need to be taken into account in quantitative policy work. These features are particularly relevant in the context of this paper, as sovereign default episodes are inherently non-linear events and default risk causes large variations in risk premia with important consequences for macroeconomic outcomes, as shown below.

---

6 Also relatedly, Anand, König and Heinemann (2014) and Leonello (2017) use a global-games approach to study the role of government guarantees on the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk.

3 The Model

Time is discrete and runs infinitely. There is a single non-durable consumption good, which is also used as the numeraire and can be transformed into physical capital used for production. The economy is populated by international investors and a set of domestic agents: (i) a risk-averse infinitely-lived representative household; (ii) a continuum of (potentially) short-lived bankers who are part of the representative household; (iii) a continuum of ex-ante identical banks; (iv) a representative firm; and (v) a government.

The representative household takes consumption and savings decisions to maximize its intertemporal expected utility. It inelastically supplies labor and can save in the form of government-guaranteed deposits issued by the bank or by directly holding physical capital.

Bankers are a special class of members of the representative household with exclusive temporary access to the opportunity of investing their net worth as banks’ inside equity capital. Once they become bankers, they accumulate wealth until they retire, when they transfer it to the representative household and are replaced by new bankers.

Banks are perfectly competitive and operate under limited liability. They borrow from households and issue equity among bankers in order to comply with a regulatory capital requirement, which effectively constraints their intermediation ability. They invest both in physical capital and in risky sovereign debt. Physical capital is rented to perfectly competitive firms, which combine it with labor in order to produce consumption good.

The government issues short-term debt to finance its deficit and the cost of the deposit insurance. The government may (randomly) default, with a probability that increases in its level of debt. Default implies the write-off of a fraction of the outstanding government debt and the inability to honor deposit insurance obligations. Sovereign debt is placed among domestic banks and international investors, which are modeled as risk-averse portfolio optimizers, as in Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole and Stangeworthy (2016).

The following subsections describe each of these agents, their optimization problems and the definition of equilibrium in detail.

3.1 Households

The representative household is infinitely lived and obtains utility from consumption of non-durable goods under a standard concave, twice continuously differentiable function $u(\cdot)$. It inelastically supplies one unit of labor remunerated with a wage $W_t$, receives dividend payments from bankers $\Pi_t$ (which are net of the transfer of the initial endowment that is transferred to new bankers, as
described below), and pays lump-sum taxes $T_t$. Thus, the problem of the representative household involves choosing consumption $C_t$, deposit holdings $D_t$, and investment in physical capital $K_t^h$ so as to maximize its expected discounted lifetime utility

$$E_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i u(C_{t+i}),$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$C_t + D_t + K_t^h + h(K_t^h) = W_t + \tilde{R}_t^d D_{t-1} + R_t^k K_{t-1}^h + \Pi_t - T_t,$$

where $\beta$ is the subjective discount rate, and $\tilde{R}_t^d$ and $R_t^k$ denote, respectively, gross realized returns of deposits and of investment in physical capital. The realized return on deposits is $\tilde{R}_t^d = R_t^d - \Psi_t$, which amounts to the promised return $R_t^d$ minus the losses realized in case of from bank failure $\Psi_t$. The gross return of investment in physical capital is $R_t^k = r_t^k + 1 - \delta$, which is the sum of the rental rate of capital $r_t^k$ plus the undepreciated physical capital recovered after production takes place (with $\delta$ equal to the depreciation rate).

The representative household incurs in a management cost per unit invested in physical capital. Similarly to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), the management cost could reflect the comparative disadvantage of households with respect to banks in screening and monitoring investment projects. The capital management cost, denoted $h(K_t^h)$, is assumed to be increasing and convex in the total amount of capital held by the household.

It will be useful to define the household’s net worth $N_t$ as the relevant state variable for the household problem at the beginning of period $t$:

$$N_t = W_t + \tilde{R}_t^d D_{t-1} + R_t^k K_{t-1}^h + \Pi_t - T_t.$$

The household’s stochastic discount factor, which appears in the problem of the representative banker below, can be defined as $\Lambda_{t+1} \equiv \beta u'(C_{t+1}) / u'(C_t)$.

### 3.2 Bankers

As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), bankers are a special class of members of the household who get exclusive temporary access to the opportunity of investing their net worth as banks’ inside equity capital. They have an iid probability of retiring each period denoted by $1 - \varphi$. When they do so,

---

8 The convention used here is that $\tilde{R}_t^d$ is the realized return on deposits after the realization of aggregate uncertainty in period $t$, while $R_t^d$ is the promised return when the investment decisions are taken. As explained below, since deposits are insured by the government, $\Psi_t$ will be equal to zero as long as the government does not default, and (potentially) positive otherwise.
they transfer their terminal net worth to the household and are replaced by new bankers that start
with an exogenous fraction $\varpi$ of the net worth of the household.

At the beginning of every period, after bankers learn whether they will continue for at least one
more period, they have the possibility of transferring a fraction $1 - x_t$ of their net worth to the
household as dividend payouts. Again as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), the value function of the
bankers is linear in the level of their net worth (since, as shown below, the returns of the bank are
constant returns to scale), so the marginal value of one unit of net worth can be written as:

$$v_t = 1 - x_t + x_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t+1} (1 - \varphi + \varphi v_{t+1}) \tilde{R}_{t+1} \right].$$  (4)

The problem of an active banker consists of choosing the fraction $x_t$ of its net worth reinvested as
bank equity, taking returns $\tilde{R}_{t+1}$ and the stochastic discount factor of the household $\Lambda_{t+1}$ as given.
Note that, from the expression above, bankers will always choose to invest all of their net worth
as bank equity ($x_t = 1$) as long as $v_t \geq 1$, in which case they optimally choose to postpone any
dividend payments until retirement. The numerical exercise below will focus on a parameterization
where $v_t \geq 1$ (and thus $x_t = 1$) holds for every period.

Letting $E_t$ denote the aggregate accumulated net worth of active bankers, the dividend payments
transferred to households, net of the initial endowment that households transfer to new bankers,
can be described as

$$\Pi_t = (1 - \varphi) \tilde{R}_t E_{t-1} + \varphi (1 - x_t) \tilde{R}_t E_{t-1} - (1 - \varphi) \varpi N_t,$$  (5)

where the first term represents the dividends paid by bankers who retire, the second term represents
discretionary dividends by continuing bankers, and the third term are the transfers received as an
initial endowment by entering bankers. The aggregate level of bankers’ net worth evolves according
to the following law of motion:

$$E_t = x_t \varphi \tilde{R}_t E_{t-1} + (1 - \varphi) \varpi N_t,$$  (6)

where the first term represents the returns of the net worth of surviving bankers invested as bank
equity and the second term represents the initial endowment of new bankers.

3.3 Banks

There is a continuum of measure one of perfectly competitive ex-ante identical banks indexed by
$j \in [0, 1]$. A bank lasts for one period only: it is an investment project created at $t$ and liquidated
at $t + 1$. Banks raise deposit funds $d_{j,t}$ from households with a promised return $R_{t}^d$, and equity
$e_{j,t}$ from bankers. They can invest both in physical capital $k_{j,t}$ and in government bonds $b_{j,t}$,
with stochastic returns $\tilde{R}^k_{t+1}\omega_{j,t}$ and $\tilde{R}^b_{t+1}$, respectively. The banks in this economy represent a consolidation of financial intermediaries and capital producing firms. Investment in physical capital uses a bank-specific production technology that transforms one unit of consumption good at $t$ into $\omega_{j,t+1}$ effective units of capital at $t + 1$, similarly to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).

Banks operate under limited liability, which means that the equity payoffs generated by a bank at time $t + 1$ are given by the positive part of the difference between the returns from its assets and the repayments due to its deposits. If the returns from its assets are greater than the repayments due to its deposits, the difference is paid back to the bank’s equity holders. Otherwise, the bank equity is written down to zero.

Taking as given the marginal value of one unit of the bankers’ net worth $v_t$ and the bankers’ stochastic discount factor $\Omega_{t+1} \equiv \Lambda_{t+1}(1 - \varphi + \varphi v_{t+1})$, as well as the promised return of deposits $R^d_t$ and the assets’ stochastic return, the representative bank chooses the portfolio allocation $(k_{j,t}, b_{j,t})$ and liability structure $(d_{j,t}, e_{j,t})$ that solve the following problem:

\[
\text{Max } \mathbb{E}_t \Omega_{t+1} \max \left\{ \tilde{R}^k_{t+1}\omega_{j,t}k_{j,t} + \tilde{R}^b_{t+1}b_{j,t} - R^d_t d_{j,t} - m(d_{j,t}, b_{j,t}), 0 \right\} - v_t e_{j,t},
\]

subject to

\[
k_{j,t} + b_{j,t} = d_{j,t} + e_{j,t},
\]

\[
e_{j,t} \geq \gamma(k_{j,t} + b_{j,t}).
\]

Equation (8) represents the bank’s balance sheet constraint, while equation (9) represents the regulatory capital requirement, which imposes that at least a fraction $\gamma$ of the banks’ risk-weighted assets has to be financed with equity capital. Government bond holdings are subject to a risk weight of $\iota$, while investment in physical capital is subject to a risk weight normalized to one.\(^9\)

The term $m(d_t, b_t)$ describes liquidity management costs faced by the bank, which are assumed to be homogenous of degree one, increasing in the amount of deposits $d_t$ issued, decreasing in the amount of the government bonds $b_t$ they hold, and go to infinity as $b_t$ goes to zero. The role of government bonds in reducing banks’ liquidity management costs could be justified in a model in which (demand) deposits offer liquidity services to their holders, who may withdraw them at some interim period (as in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Selling (or borrowing against) government bonds, rather than using more costly alternatives such as the sale of (or borrowing against) less liquid assets, would allow the bank to better accommodate random deposit withdrawals.\(^10\)

\(^9\) Note that, if deposits are cheaper than equity financing, which always happens in equilibrium under parameterization presented in Section 4, the capital requirement is binding.

\(^10\) As shown in Repullo and Suarez (2004), one-period lived perfectly competitive banks subject to limited liability that could invest in two different risky assets would optimally specialize in one of them, unless there exist intermediation
Each bank idiosyncratic productivity $\omega_{j,t+1}$ is log-normally distributed with mean one and cross-sectional standard deviation $\sigma$, independent across time and across banks, making banks’ returns heterogeneous ex-post. This idiosyncratic productivity represents exposure to sources of risk resulting from a bank’s geographic or sectoral specialization, which might, in turn, stem from specific knowledge of bankers on certain regions or sectors that are subject to heterogeneous shocks. Given that idiosyncratic productivity $\omega_{j,t+1}$ is independently distributed, all banks will behave in an identical manner, allowing to drop the $j$ subscript ($k_{j,t} = k_t$, $b_{j,t} = b_t$, $d_{j,t} = d_t$, $e_{j,t} = e_t$).

The idiosyncratic return of the investment technology implies that the banks which draw a value of $\omega_{j,t+1}$ below a (stochastic) threshold will default every period. The threshold is given by

$$\omega_t + 1 = \frac{R^d_t d_t + m(d_t, b_t) - \tilde{R}^b_{t+1} b_t}{R^c_{t+1} k_t}.$$  \hfill (10)

Banks’ investment in physical capital is also subject to aggregate risk, which takes the form of a large and infrequent iid bank failure shock denoted by $\psi_{t+1} \in \{0, 1\}$, whose realization is unknown when the investment decisions are taken.\(^\text{11}\) When the shock realizes ($\psi_{t+1} = 1$), which occurs with probability $\pi$, a fraction $\lambda$ of the continuum of banks obtains a return on investment equal to zero.\(^\text{12}\)

The expected return on investment conditional on the realization of the aggregate shock $\psi_{t+1}$ can be written as $(1 - \lambda \psi_{t+1})(r^k_t + 1 - \delta)$. This shock, by affecting banks’ returns, effectively raises aggregate bank failure when it realizes (by decreasing the numerator in equation (10)). Accordingly, bank failure rate in period $t + 1$ is $F(\omega_{t+1}) + \lambda \psi_{t+1} [1 - F(\omega_{t+1})]$.

### 3.4 Firms

The standard, perfectly competitive representative firm rents physical capital $K_t$ (remunerated at a rate $r^k_t$) and hires labor $L_t$ (remunerated at a rate $W_t$) in order to produce consumption good under a Cobb-Douglas function where $\alpha$ is the elasticity of capital. Its profit-maximization problem is:

$$\max_{(K_t, L_t)} K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha} - r^k_t K_t - W_t L_t.$$  \hfill (11)

costs that imply some complementarity between the two assets. Here the complementarity comes from the different degrees of liquidity of each asset, which ensures an interior solution to the portfolio problem of the representative bank. The liquidity role of public debt has been analyzed in the theoretical literature, for instance in Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).

\(^\text{11}\)The bank failure shock could be modeled as a persistent process at the small cost of adding an extra state variable. However, as shown in the numerical results of Section 4, even non-persistent aggregate shocks can have very persistent effects on the model economy.

\(^\text{12}\)The nature of this shock can be interpreted to be similar to the capital quality shocks in Gertler and Karadi (2011), or the systemic shock in Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2014). Unlike in the latter paper, the exposure of banks to this shock is assumed to be exogenously given. This is done for simplicity, since the interest of this paper is on the endogenous exposure of banks to sovereign risk.
The government

The government issues short-term debt to finance its deficit. Its budget constraint states that, each period, the issuance of one-period bonds $B_t$ has to be equal to the cost of servicing previous period debt $\tilde{R}_t B_{t-1}$, the cost of the deposit insurance scheme $DI_t$, and public spending $G_t$ minus tax revenues $T_t$:

$$B_t = \tilde{R}_t B_{t-1} + DI_t + G_t - T_t,$$

(12)

There is a stochastic limit to the level of sovereign debt which the government can commit to repay, which follows a logistic distribution, similarly to Bi and Traum (2012) and Bocola (2016). This stochastic limit depends on the level of debt outstanding (as a fraction of net output $Y_t$) so that, when such limit is exceeded, the government defaults. The government default event at the end of period $t$ is represented by the binary variable $s_{t+1} \in \{0, 1\}$ and the probability of default in each period is determined by

$$p_t \equiv \text{Prob}(s_{t+1} = 1|B_t/Y_t) = \frac{\exp(\eta_1 + \eta_2 (B_t/Y_t))}{1 + \exp(\eta_1 + \eta_2 (B_t/Y_t))}.$$

(13)

If the government does not default ($s_{t+1} = 0$), it pays back the promised (gross) return $R^b_t$ per unit of debt to its creditors and the deposit insurance liabilities $DI_t$ to the banks’ depositors. If it defaults ($s_{t+1} = 1$), it writes off a fraction $\theta \in [0, 1]$ of its outstanding stock of debt and it is unable to honor its deposit insurance liabilities. Thus, the realized return of the government bonds can be expressed as

$$\tilde{R}^b_{t+1} = (1 - \theta s_{t+1}) R^b_t.$$

(14)

Tax revenues are determined according to a fiscal rule

$$T_t = \tau_y Y_t + \tau_b B_{t-1},$$

(15)

where the first term can be interpreted as the automatic-stabilizer component and the second term can be interpreted as the debt-stabilizer component of tax revenues. Furthermore, government spending is assumed to be equal to a constant fraction $g$ of the steady-state level of net output $\bar{Y}$ ($G_t = g \bar{Y}$).

When a bank fails, its equity capital is written down to zero and the deposits become a liability for the government, which has to repay principal and interests in full to the depositors. The deposit insurance scheme takes over the failed banks’ assets minus bank resolution costs which are assumed

As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), net aggregate output is defined as output $K^\alpha_t L^{1-\alpha}$ minus the household’s capital management cost $h(K_t)$. 

11
to be a fraction $\mu$ of the assets of the bank, as in Mendicino et al. (2018), resulting in a deadweight loss every time a bank defaults. Deposit insurance liabilities can be expressed as

$$DI_t = (1 - s_t) \left[ \left( R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} + m(d_{t-1}, b_{t-1}) - \tilde{R}_t b_{t-1} \right) \left( F(\omega_t) + \lambda \psi_t (1 - F(\omega_t)) \right) \right. \
\left. - (1 - \mu) R_t^b k_{t-1} \Gamma(\omega_t)(1 - \lambda \psi_t) \right]. \quad (16)$$

When the government defaults ($s_{t+1} = 1$) and is unable to honor its deposit guarantees, the failed banks’ assets net of resolution costs are repossessed directly by the banks’ debtholders, who bear the full losses. These losses can be expressed as

$$\Psi_t \Delta_t = s_t \left[ \left( R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} + m(d_{t-1}, b_{t-1}) - \tilde{R}_t b_{t-1} \right) \left( F(\omega_t) + \lambda \psi_t (1 - F(\omega_t)) \right) \right. \
\left. - (1 - \mu) R_t^b k_{t-1} \Gamma(\omega_t)(1 - \lambda \psi_t) \right]. \quad (17)$$

### 3.6 International investors

As in Aguiar et al. (2016), international financial markets are segmented, such that only a subset of foreign investors participates in the domestic sovereign debt market. For simplicity, foreign investors are modeled as one-period lived risk-averse agents who start with some exogenous endowment $W^f$ and are replaced by a new set of lenders in the following period. The representative investor solves

$$\max_{B_t^f} \mathbb{E}_t u_f(C_{t+1}^f),$$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$C_{t+1}^f = \tilde{R}_{t+1}^b B_t^f + R \left( W^f - B_t^f \right),$$

where $u_f(\cdot)$ is a standard concave, twice continuously differentiable function and $C_{t+1}^f$ is investors wealth at the end of the period. International investors can choose between investing their endowment in government bonds or in an international risk-free asset which offers them a gross return $R^f$ (or they can also borrow at the same rate).

### 3.7 Market clearing

Every period, the aggregate level of bankers’ net worth must equal the bank equity issued by the banks; the level of deposits supplied by the household must equal the deposits issued by the banks; the supply of government bonds must equal the bonds held by the banks and the international investors; the physical capital rented by the consumption good producing firm must equal the stock of capital held by the household and by the banks; and the firms’ labor demand must equal the unit of labor inelastically supplied by the household.
3.8 Equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium is given by the policy functions for the representative household, the representative banker, the representative bank, the representative firm, and the representative international investor, such that, given a sequence of equilibrium prices and a sequence of realization of shocks, the sequence of each of the agents’ decisions solve their corresponding problems, the sequence of prices clears all markets, and the sequence of endogenous state variables satisfies their corresponding laws of motion. A formal definition of the competitive equilibrium, together with the complete set of optimality and market clearing conditions, is provided in Appendix B.

4 Numerical results

This section introduces the functional forms chosen for the numerical analysis, presents the baseline parameterization, and outlines the computational method used to obtain the numerical solution of the model.

4.1 Functional forms

In the numerical analysis below, the functional form chosen for the utility function of the household is

\[ u(C_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\nu}}{1-\nu} \]

with constant risk-aversion parameter \( \nu \). The same functional form is chosen for the utility function of international investors, for which the constant risk-aversion parameter is denoted \( \nu^f \).

The capital management cost function is equal to

\[ h(K_t^h) = \kappa (K_t^h)^2 \]

as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). A functional form for the liquidity management costs compatible with the assumptions described in subsection 3.3 is given by

\[ m(d_t, b_t) = \phi \left( \frac{d_t}{b_t} \right) d_t. \]

4.2 Calibration

The calibration strategy consists of a two-step procedure. In the first step, standard parameters of the model are either (i) set to commonly agreed values in the business cycle literature; (ii) taken from related macro-banking papers, when available; or (iii) chosen to match certain empirical targets directly observable in the data. These parameters are mostly the ones concerning household preferences and the aggregate production function, some of the most standard parameters in the banking side of the model, and parameters related to the fiscal part.

In the second step, values for the remaining parameters are set so as to jointly match certain empirical moments in the data.\(^{14}\) In particular, most of the structural parameters ensure that the

---

\(^{14}\)Although the calibration of these parameters is done in a joint manner, most of them can be associated to a
Table 1: Baseline parameterization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subjective discount rate</td>
<td>$\beta$ 0.99</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>$\nu$ 2</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output elasticity of capital</td>
<td>$\alpha$ 0.33</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate of capital</td>
<td>$\delta$ 0.025</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital requirement</td>
<td>$\gamma$ 0.08</td>
<td>Basel III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk weight of sov. bonds</td>
<td>$\iota$ 0.0</td>
<td>Basel III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankruptcy cost</td>
<td>$\mu$ 0.3</td>
<td>Mendicino et al (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankers’ exit rate</td>
<td>$\varphi$ 0.96</td>
<td>Bocola (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write-off parameter</td>
<td>$\theta$ 0.55</td>
<td>Bocola (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. investors’ risk aversion</td>
<td>$\nu^f$ 2</td>
<td>Aguiar et al (2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital mgmt. cost</td>
<td>$\kappa$ 0.00025</td>
<td>Share of $K$ held by households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New bankers’ endowment</td>
<td>$\varpi$ 0.005</td>
<td>Banks’ return on equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity mgmt. cost</td>
<td>$\phi$ 1e-6</td>
<td>Banks’ exposure to sov. debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion of iid shock</td>
<td>$\sigma$ 0.03</td>
<td>Bank failure rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction affected if $\psi_t=1$</td>
<td>$\lambda$ 0.10</td>
<td>Fiscal cost of crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob($\psi_t=1$)</td>
<td>$\pi$ 0.0076</td>
<td>Systemic shock frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. spending</td>
<td>$g$ 0.25</td>
<td>Govt. final consumption expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic stabilizer</td>
<td>$\tau_y$ 0.20</td>
<td>Tax revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt stabilizer</td>
<td>$\tau_b$ 0.06</td>
<td>Debt over GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign default parameter 1</td>
<td>$\eta_1$ -12</td>
<td>Average default probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign default parameter 2</td>
<td>$\eta_2$ 15</td>
<td>Sov. yield sensitivity to $B/Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. risk-free rate</td>
<td>$R^f$ 1.0088</td>
<td>Yield on German bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. investors’ endowment</td>
<td>$W^f$ 3</td>
<td>Share of debt held by international investors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parameter values and moments targeted are summarized in Table 1, while the stochastic steady state values for selected endogenous variables of the model under the baseline parameterization and their empirical counterparts are reported in Table 2.

The model is calibrated to quarterly frequency. The subjective discount rate $\beta$ and the risk-aversion parameter $\nu$ of the representative household are set equal to standard values in the literature of 0.99 and 2, respectively. Similarly, the elasticity of physical capital $\alpha$ and its depreciation rate particular empirical target, as reported in Table 1.
\( \delta \) are set to 0.33 and 0.025. The capital management cost for households \( \kappa \) is equal to 0.00025, which implies that, in equilibrium, households directly hold around 15% of the physical capital in the economy, while the rest is held by banks.

The bankers’ exit rate \( \varphi \) is equal to 0.96, as in Bocola (2016), and the new bankers’ endowment \( \varpi \) is equal to 0.005, similar to the value in Gertler and Karadi (2011), implying an average return on equity close to 15% in annualized terms.

The capital requirement \( \gamma \) is set to 0.08, as in Clerc et al. (2015), compatible with the full weight level of Basel I and the treatment of not rated corporate loans in Basel II and III. The risk weight of government bonds is set to zero in the baseline case, in line with the current regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures. This parameter takes several different values in the counterfactual exercises performed below. The liquidity management cost is set to 1e-6, a value that guarantees an interior solution in the banks’ portfolio problem and implies that sovereign bond holdings represent around 6% of banks’ total assets. Again as in Clerc et al. (2015) and Mendicino et al. (2018), the bank bankruptcy cost (the fraction of the banks’ assets value that cannot recover in case of bankruptcy) is set to 0.3.

The standard deviation \( \sigma \) of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks \( \omega \) is equal to 0.03, which implies an average bank failure rate equal to 1%, similarly to Mendicino et al. (2018). The probability \( \pi \) that the bank failure shock realizes is equal to 0.0076, which means that, on average, it occurs once each 33 years, a frequency close to the systemic shock in Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2014). The fraction \( \lambda \) of banks affected when the shock realizes is set equal to 0.10.

The level of government spending as a fraction of output \( g \) is set to 0.25. The parameters governing the tax revenues \( \tau_y \) and \( \tau_b \) are set to 0.20 and 0.06, respectively, which imply that tax revenues equal 26% of GDP and a steady state ratio of debt-to-GDP around 30%, which matches the average in Spanish data for the period from 2000 to 2008 (excluding debt held by domestic agents other than banks).

The write-off parameter for sovereign debt \( \theta \) is set to 0.55, again as in Bocola (2016), which is in line with the number Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2013) report for the case of the debt restructuring of Greece in 2012. The parameters of the fiscal limit distribution imply a stochastic steady state level of the sovereign yield spread with respect to the risk-free rate of about 30bps points, while the average probability of default is around 0.18%, very close to the value estimated in Bocola (2016) for the case of Italy in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, and reproduce the sensitivity of sovereign yields to changes in the level of debt (sovereign debt spreads raise to around 500bps during the average crisis in the model, as shown below; for a comparison
Table 2: Selected endogenous variables at the stochastic steady state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annualized intl. risk-free rate $R^f$</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized return on equity $R^e$</td>
<td>14.88%</td>
<td>11.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized sov. bond yield $R^b$</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized deposit rate $R^d$</td>
<td>3.72%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign debt (% of GDP)</td>
<td>28.74%</td>
<td>31.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of sov. debt held abroad</td>
<td>61.06%</td>
<td>64.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized sov. default probability</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of $K_t$ held by banks</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>≈ 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks’ leverage (assets/equity)</td>
<td>13.23%</td>
<td>13.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks’ sovereign exposure (% of assets)</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>≈ 6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP$_t$ is defined as output $Y_t$ minus capital management costs $b(K^p_t)$. Empirical moments correspond to Spanish data during the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2008, except for the annualized international risk-free rate, which refers to the yield of a one-year German sovereign bond, and the annualized sovereign default probability which corresponds to the estimate in Boccola (2016) for the case of Italy. Data sources are described in the Appendix.

Finally, the international risk-free rate $R$ is equal to 1.008, which matches the annualized yield of one-year German bonds in the pre-crisis period. The international investors’ risk-aversion parameter $\nu^f$ is set to 2, the same as for the domestic household, as in Aguiar et al. (2016). The endowment $W^f$ is set to 3, so that the share of domestic sovereign debt held abroad is around 60%, which is around the pre-crisis levels for European peripheral countries (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012).

### 4.3 Solution method

The model is solved using global solution methods. In particular, the method used is policy function iteration (Coleman, 1990), also known as time iteration (Judd, 1998). Functions are approximated using piecewise linear interpolation, as advocated in Richter, Throckmorton and Walker (2014). A detailed description of the numerical solution method and some measures of its accuracy are provided in the Appendix.

Using global solution methods is important given the inherent non-linearities present in sovereign default models. Traditional log-linearisation methods are not able to capture the variation in risk premia (due to the certainty equivalence), which represents an important source of amplification in this model, as shown below, while higher order perturbation methods provide accurate approximations only locally, failing to capture the dynamics of models with large deviations from the
steady state as the one presented here.\textsuperscript{15} The main drawback of using global solution methods is that they are very computationally intensive, which constrains the size of the models that can be feasibly solved. This is because each additional state variable increases exponentially the size of the steady state, rendering the so called curse of dimensionality. Recent improvements in computational power and numerical solution procedures, as surveyed in Maliar and Maliar (2014) and Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016), allow to solve increasingly complex models, but still pose a constraint that is not easily overcome.

5 Main results

This section presents the main quantitative properties of the model and provides two counterfactual exercises. The first one tries to quantify the contribution of the feedback loop by switching off the time variation of sovereign risk, assuming that the probability of default is always constant and equal to the average probability of default in the ergodic distribution of the model under the baseline parameterization. The second one analyzes the potential effects of introducing a positive risk weight for sovereign debt in the calculation of regulatory capital requirements. In particular, this section compares both the changes in the stochastic steady state of the model, the dynamic responses to a bank failure shock triggering a banking crisis, and the changes in welfare under the alternative parameterizations in each of the counterfactual exercises.

5.1 Contribution of the feedback loop

In order to assess the amplification effects of the feedback loop between banks and the sovereign, this section first presents the dynamic response to a bank failure shock when sovereign default risk does not react to increases in the outstanding amount of debt and remains constant for all periods. To achieve this, the parameters governing the probability of default, $\eta_1$ and $\eta_2$, are set equal to -7.5 and 0, respectively, so that $p_t$ becomes time invariant and equal to 0.22%, which is roughly equal to the unconditional probability of default under the baseline parameterization.

Figure 1 presents the impulse-response functions to a bank failure shock under the alternative constant-risk parameterization described above. The realization of the bank failure shock $\psi_t$ is set equal to 1 for $t = 0$ and equal to 0 for all other $t$ from there on. The realization of the sovereign default event $s_t$ is equal to 0 for all $t$, meaning that the default event does not materialize ex-post in

the simulated paths depicted.\footnote{Nevertheless, all of the agents form their expectations taking into account the possibility that the government defaults on its obligations.} Each panel represents the dynamic responses of one of the selected endogenous variables, in deviations from the stochastic steady state values in $t = -1$.

The initial shock drives up the realized bank failure rate by 10 percentage points, which translates into a 10% decrease in the level of aggregate bank equity and an increase in the outstanding sovereign debt of 60% from its initial level, due to the increase in the deposit insurance liabilities of the government. The fall in GDP (defined as total output minus the households’ physical capital management cost) is caused by the shrinkage of the banks’ balance sheets and the change in the composition of the owners of physical capital: since the decrease in aggregate bank equity constrains the ability of banks to invest in physical capital, the share of the aggregate stock that is managed by the household increases, resulting in a decrease in net output.

The increase in the stock of debt is absorbed by the banks, who increase their exposure relative to the size of their balance sheet, and by the international investors, who also increase their bond holdings in absolute terms (although the share of the total outstanding debt they hold slightly decreases). The riskiness of the sovereign bonds under this alternative parameterization, as described above, remains constant, making their promised return increase only slightly (and as a result of the
increase in the supply of bonds). The expected bank failure rate remains barely unchanged and so does the promised return of deposits, which increases a few basis points. The relative scarcity of bankers’ net worth increases the return on equity due to the increase in the marginal product of physical capital, making the aggregate level of bank equity to quickly recover.

Figure 2 presents, with solid black lines, the dynamic response to the same shock under the baseline parameterization described in Table 1, where sovereign risk does react to increases in the outstanding level of debt. The dotted red lines depict the same impulse response functions as in Figure 1, when sovereign risk is time invariant and exogenously given.

Following the initial 60% increase in the level of sovereign debt (from around 30 to 50% of GDP), the annualized probability of default goes up by 300 bps, from an initial 0.18% (see Table 2). This sudden increase translates into a spike of the interest rate paid by the government of more than 400 bps, to which banks react by increasing their exposure by almost 10 percentage points. The increased exposure of banks to sovereign risk and their higher leverage makes the expected bank failure rate go up by more than 200 bps. As a result, the depositors, anticipating that a sovereign default, which is now much more likely, would mean the failure of the deposit insurance scheme, demand a deposit rate up to 200 bps higher. The increase in funding costs have a large impact on banks’ profitability, making the aggregate level of bank equity go further down to a -40% of its initial
level after a few quarters. This drop is much larger than the one under the time-invariant sovereign risk counterfactual parameterization. It also has severe contractionary effects on net output due to the tightening of the constraints on banks’ investment. Furthermore, since banks increase the deposits they borrow from households, this crowds out households’ investment in physical capital, resulting in a sharper on-impact contraction of GDP than under the constant-risk scenario.

In all, these results illustrate the amplification effects that sovereign default risk has on the banking sector, representing an important source of systemic risk. As shown in Figure 2, an initial shock that affects a relatively small fraction of banks translates into system-wide instability through the endogenous contagion effect that sovereign risk has on bank failure risk, even if the default of the government does not materialize ex-post, as in the simulated trajectories depicted above.

The increase in banks’ funding costs and the resulting decrease in their profitability, in addition to the high yield paid by the government bonds, encourages banks to increase their exposure to sovereign risk. Given the opacity of their balance sheets and the non-contractibility of their portfolio allocations, individual banks do not internalize the effect of their increased riskiness on the funding costs of the whole banking sector. Furthermore, because of limited liability, they can enjoy the high returns from holding sovereign bonds as long as the government does not default, while suffering limited losses in case the default materializes, effectively shifting the risk to their depositors. Thus, the results seem to point to a potential role for macroprudential regulation in making banks internalize the effects of their sovereign exposures and in mitigating the negative effects of the feedback loop.

Figure 3 further illustrates the quantitative properties of the model in terms of its ability to fit the dynamics of the recent European sovereign debt crisis. The horizontal axis displays sovereign yield spreads (in basis points), calculated as the difference between the annualized yield of 10-year Spanish (Italian) government bonds and the annualized yield of 10-year German bond. The vertical axis displays deposit rate spreads (also in basis points), calculated as the difference between the annualized yield of Spanish (Italian) banks’ interest rate on deposits with agreed maturity of up to one year and the annualized yield of 1-year German bond. Data points correspond to monthly observations for the period between 2009 and 2017. The observations from the model are obtained from the simulation of the dynamic response to a bank failure shock, as depicted in Figure 2. Simulated data points span the equivalent length in quarters. The model does remarkably well in matching the correlation of sovereign yields and deposit rate spreads during crises, suggesting its ability to quantitatively capture the endogenous feedback effects between sovereign and bank risk.

\footnote{Data sources are provided in the Appendix.}
It is possible to compare social welfare under both scenarios, in order to quantify the loss associated to the feedback loop between sovereign and bank risk. To this end, the expected value of the household intertemporal utility is computed by averaging across a large number of simulations of the model economy. More formally, the proposed measure of welfare $V_0$ can be defined as

$$V_0 = E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t) \right]. \quad (20)$$

Then it is possible to represent welfare in terms of equivalent permanent consumption units by obtaining the value $C$ that solves the equation

$$V_0 = \frac{u(C)}{1 - \beta}. \quad (21)$$

The result is that the welfare loss resulting from the feedback loop, obtained from the comparison between the model economy under the baseline calibration and the counterfactual constant-risk scenario, amounts to a decrease of 1.3% of equivalent permanent consumption units.
5.2 Bank capital requirements for sovereign exposures

This section analyzes the macroprudential implications of bank capital requirements for sovereign exposures. Figure 4 presents the dynamic response to the same shock under a number of parameterizations where the risk weight $\iota$ applied to banks’ sovereign bond holdings in the calculation of regulatory capital requirements is increased from its initial level of zero. Each of the blue lines depict the impulse-response function under a different risk weight $\iota$, following 5% increments, with lighter colors representing higher values, from 5% to 70%.

Increasing capital requirements for banks’ sovereign exposures has two effects: first, for the same promised return, it makes investing in sovereign debt less attractive. This is because the cost of equity is higher than the cost of deposits. Furthermore, the equity losses that banks would suffer in case of default are higher; this is the well-known “skin-in-the-game” effect. Second, it reduces banks’ leverage, making banks effectively safer and thus decreasing the depositors losses in case of default. This translates into lower funding costs, less amplification effects and quicker recoveries from the initial shock. Each increase in the risk weight $\iota$ brings the trajectory of the response of bank equity closer to the alternative parameterization with constant sovereign risk presented in Figure 1, depicted by the red dashed lines, suggesting that capital requirements are effective in
mitigating the effects of the bank-sovereign feedback loop on financial instability.

However, the benefits of increasing the risk weight for sovereign exposures do not come at no cost. First, imposing capital requirements for domestic banks’ debt holdings increases the funding costs for the government. This is because domestic banks, as opposed to international investors, benefit from the liquidity services of holding sovereign bonds, and therefore demand lower returns on their bond holdings. Second, and more importantly, initial contractions in GDP become sharper at the beginning of crises. This is because banks are now required to use part of their equity to back their sovereign bond holdings, which leaves them with a lower amount of equity available for other purposes, effectively crowding out banks’ investment in physical capital. Thus, the drop in banks’ investment when equity is relatively more scarce is amplified. Nevertheless, economic activity recovers quicker than in the baseline case with zero risk weights due to the overall decrease in bank risk and the subsequent quicker recovery of aggregate bank capital.

The results above suggest the existence of non-trivial welfare tradeoffs resulting from increases of sovereign debt risk weights. In order to assess the socially optimal risk weight, Figure 5 presents the welfare gains in terms of equivalent permanent consumption units that are obtained for different values of $\iota$. The results confirm that marginal departures from the zero risk weight lead to relatively large welfare gains. These gains, however, seem to exhaust when risk weights go beyond a certain
Table 3: Selected endogenous variables at the stochastic steady state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\iota = 0$</th>
<th>$\iota = 40%$</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annualized return on equity $R^e$</td>
<td>14.88%</td>
<td>14.96%</td>
<td>8 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized return of capital $R^k$</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
<td>4 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized sov. bond yield $R^b$</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
<td>10 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized deposit rate $R^d$</td>
<td>3.72%</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>3 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare (= equiv. constant consumption units)</td>
<td>1.449</td>
<td>1.458</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>2.964</td>
<td>2.959</td>
<td>-0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>-0.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign debt (% of GDP)</td>
<td>28.74%</td>
<td>28.28%</td>
<td>46 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of sov. debt held abroad</td>
<td>61.06%</td>
<td>77.49%</td>
<td>16.4 pps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized sov. default probability</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>-1 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of $K_t$ held by banks</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>-40 bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks’ leverage (assets/equity)</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>12.75</td>
<td>-3.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks’ sovereign exposure (% of bank assets)</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>3.22%</td>
<td>2.3 pps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annualized default rate of banks</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>-11 bps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* GDP$_t$ is defined as output $Y_t$ minus capital management costs $h(K^n_t)$.

point, due to the above-mentioned trade offs involved. In this numerical exercise, the point that maximizes social welfare, for a given capital requirement $\gamma$ of 8%, is reached when $\iota = 40\%$, implying an increase of 0.56% equivalent permanent consumption units relative to the zero risk weight scenario.

Table 3 summarizes the stochastic steady state values for selected endogenous variables of the model under the baseline parameterization and compares them with the values for the counterfactual scenario in which the risk weight is set to the socially optimal level ($\iota = 40\%$).

6 Concluding remarks

This paper examines the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking crises, and the potential effects of capital requirements for banks’ sovereign exposures on mitigating it by discouraging banks’ endogenous exposure to sovereign risk. To this purpose, it develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which banks decide on their exposure to sovereign debt issued by a government subject to default risk.

One of the contributions of the model presented in this paper is that it features both endogenous bank failure risk and sovereign default risk, which have reinforcing effects on each other (what has been called the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns). The model allows to study the macroeconomic consequences of such feedback effects: the impact of an increase in bank failure on
the probability of a sovereign default resulting from government guarantees, the endogenous increase in banks’ exposure to sovereign risk, and the feedback effects that an increase in the sovereign default risk have on banks’ solvency and their funding costs. In this sense, the possibility of a sovereign default acts as an important source of systemic risk, by which an initial shock to a small fraction of banks translates into system-wide instability.

Distortions resulting from banks’ limited liability make investing in risky sovereign debt attractive for banks, who enjoy high profits insofar as the government does not default and suffer losses limited to their initial equity contributions otherwise. These risk-shifting incentives result in excessive exposure to sovereign risk. At the same time, the possibility that the government defaults not only on its outstanding stock of debt but also on its deposit insurance liabilities translates into higher funding costs for the banks when they increase their exposure to the risky sovereign. When depositors cannot observe the balance sheet composition of individual banks, these do not internalize the effect of their individual risk-taking choices on the funding costs of the whole banking system.

By disrupting banks’ intermediation ability, the effects of the feedback loop have dramatic consequences for economic activity, even when the sovereign default event does not materialize ex-post. Thus, the model environment provides a rationale for macroprudential policies aimed to reduce banks’ incentives to excessively expose themselves to sovereign risk.

The model is used to address some of the central issues in recent discussions about the current regulatory treatment of banks’ exposure to (domestic) sovereign debt. In particular, the paper analyzes the potential macroprudential role of capital requirements for sovereign debt. The main finding is that a positive risk weight for sovereign debt in the calculation of capital requirements both reduces banks’ endogenous exposure to sovereign risk and makes bank effectively safer and, consequently, helps mitigating the two-way feedback effects between banking and sovereign crises and its negative spillovers on economic activity.

Under the proposed calibration of the model parameters, the quantitative results indicate that the feedback loop generates substantial amplification effects during financial crises, contributing to substantial welfare losses. The assessment of the macroprudential implications of a change in the regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures evaluates the social welfare gains associated to different risk weights of sovereign debt in the regulatory capital requirements, finding an interior maximum social welfare at a risk weight of 40%, for a given capital requirement of 8%. The results identify non-trivial welfare trade-offs resulting from the implementation of the proposed regulatory reform, which exhaust the potential benefits of further increasing the risk weight for sovereign
exposures beyond a certain point.

Other sets of macroprudential policies could also be analyzed in the context of the model, such as time-varying capital requirements, concentration limits to the exposure of banks to sovereign debt, or different combinations of the general regulatory capital requirement and the risk weights for sovereign debt exposures, among others.

The model could also be used to analyze the international dimension of the feedback loop. This would be particularly interesting in the context of a monetary union and could shed light on issues such as common deposit insurance mechanisms and common resolution regimes, and their effect on international risk spillovers. Conceptually, this would only require embedding the model in a multi-country setup. The main difficulty, however, would come from the computationally intensive solution methods that would be needed to solve it. Notwithstanding this, these appear to be interesting topics for a future research agenda.
References


Appendix

A  Data sources

TBC.
B Equilibrium equations

This Appendix presents the complete set of equilibrium equations and provides the formal definition of a competitive equilibrium.

B.1 Households

The problem of the representative household (1) results in the following optimality conditions:

\[ E_t[\Lambda_{t+1} \tilde{R}^d_{t+1}] = 1, \quad (B.1) \]
\[ E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t+1} R^k_{t+1} \right] = 1 + h'(K^h_t). \quad (B.2) \]

The household’s budget constraint is given by

\[ C_t + D_t + K^h_t + h(K^h_t) = W_t + \tilde{R}^d_t D_{t-1} + R^k_t K^h_{t-1} + \Pi_t - T_t, \quad (B.3) \]

and level of the household’s net worth \( N_t \) evolves according to the following law of motion:

\[ N_t = W_t + \tilde{R}^d_t D_{t-1} + R^k_t K^h_{t-1} + \Pi_t - T_t. \quad (B.4) \]

Finally, the stochastic discount factor of the household can be defined as \( \Lambda_{t+1} \equiv \beta \frac{u'(C_{t+1})}{u'(C_t)}. \)

B.2 Bankers

The level of bankers’ net worth \( E_t \) evolves according to the following law of motion:

\[ E_t = \varphi \tilde{R}^e_t E_{t-1} + (1 - \varphi) \varpi N_t. \quad (B.5) \]

The marginal value of one unit of net worth for the bankers is

\[ v_t = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t+1} (1 - \varphi + \varphi v_{t+1}) \tilde{R}^e_{t+1} \right]. \quad (B.6) \]

B.3 Banks

The problem of the representative bank (7) results in the following optimality conditions:

\[ E_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} (1 - \lambda \psi_t) \left( R^k_{t+1} (1 - \Gamma(\varpi_{t+1})) - (m^k_t + R^d_t (1 - \gamma)) (1 - F(\varpi_{t+1})) \right) \right] = \gamma v_t, \quad (B.7) \]
\[ E_t \left[ \Omega_{t+1} (1 - \lambda \psi_t) \left( \tilde{R}^b_{t+1} - m^b_t - R^d_t (1 - \gamma \iota) (1 - F(\varpi_{t+1})) \right) \right] = v_t \gamma \iota, \quad (B.8) \]

where

\[ m^k_t \equiv \frac{\partial m(d_t, b_t)}{\partial k_t}, \]
\[ m^b_t \equiv \frac{\partial m(d_t, b_t)}{\partial b_t}, \]

are the derivatives of the liquidity management cost with respect to the investment in physical capital and in sovereign bonds, respectively, and

\[ \Gamma(x) = \int_0^x \omega f(\omega) d\omega = \Phi \left( \frac{\log(x) - \sigma^2/2}{\sigma} \right), \]

31
\[ F(x) = \int_0^x f(\omega) d\omega = \Phi \left( \frac{\log(x) + \sigma^2/2}{\sigma} \right), \]

where \( f(\omega) \) is the probability density function of the idiosyncratic shock \( \omega \) and \( \Phi(\cdot) \) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.

The balance sheet constraint is given by

\[ k_t + b_t = d_t + e_t, \quad (B.9) \]

and the regulatory capital requirement imposes that

\[ e_t = \gamma(k_t + \nu b_t). \quad (B.10) \]

### B.4 Firms

The problem of the representative firm (11) results in the following optimality conditions:

\[ r_t^k = \alpha K_t^\alpha - 1 L_t^{1 - \alpha}, \quad (B.11) \]

\[ W_t = (1 - \alpha) K_t^\alpha L_t^{1 - \alpha}. \quad (B.12) \]

### B.5 Government

The level of government debt outstanding \( B_t \) evolves according to the following law of motion:

\[ B_t = (1 - \theta s_t) R_{t-1}^b B_{t-1} + DI_t + G_t - T_t. \quad (B.13) \]

Deposit insurance liabilities can be expressed as

\[
DI_t = (1 - s_t) \left[ \left( R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} + m(d_{t-1}, b_{t-1}) - \tilde{R}_t^b b_{t-1} \right) \left[ F(\omega_t) + \lambda \psi_t (1 - F(\omega_t)) \right] - (1 - \mu) R_t^b k_{t-1} \Gamma(\omega_t) (1 - \lambda \psi_t) \right].
\]

From this expression, the loss for depositors due to banks’ failure is

\[
\Psi_t D_{t-1} = s_t \left[ \left( R_{t-1}^d d_{t-1} + m(d_{t-1}, b_{t-1}) - \tilde{R}_t^b b_{t-1} \right) \left[ F(\omega_t) + \lambda \psi_t (1 - F(\omega_t)) \right] - (1 - \mu) R_t^b k_{t-1} \Gamma(\omega_t) (1 - \lambda \psi_t) \right].
\]

### B.6 International investors

The problem of the representative international investor (18) results in the following optimality condition:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \tilde{R}_{t+1}^b - R^f \right) u_f \left( \tilde{R}_{t+1}^b B_t^f + R^f (W^f - B_t^f) \right) \right] = 0. \quad (B.16)
\]

### B.7 Market clearing

Every period, the aggregate level of bankers’ net worth must equal the bank equity issued by the banks:

\[ E_t = e_t, \quad (B.17) \]

the level of deposits supplied by the household must equal the deposits issued by the banks:

\[ D_t = d_t, \quad (B.18) \]
the supply of government bonds must equal the bonds held by the banks and the international investors:

\[ B_t = b_t + B^f_t, \]  
(B.19)

the physical capital rented by the consumption good producing firm must equal the stock of capital held by the household and by the banks:

\[ K_t = K^h_{t-1} + k_{t-1}, \]  
(B.20)

and the labor hired by the firm must equal the unit of labor inelastically supplied by the household:

\[ L_t = 1. \]  
(B.21)

**B.8 Equilibrium**

In equilibrium, the state of the economy at any date \( t \) can be summarized by three state variables collected in the vector \( S = \{ N, E, B \} \): the aggregate net worth of the representative household \( N_t \), the aggregate net worth available to the active bankers \( E_t \), and the level of sovereign debt outstanding \( B_t \). Formally:

**Definition 1.** A competitive equilibrium is given by the policy functions for the representative bank \( (k(S), b(S), d(S), e(S)) \), the representative household \( (C(S), D(S), K^h(S)) \), the representative firm \( (K(S), L(S)) \) and the representative international investor \( (B^f(S)) \), which determine the actions of each of the agents for each triple \( S = \{ N, E, B \} \), such that, given prices \( (v(S), R^d(S), R^b(S), r^k(S), w(S)) \) and the realization of the shocks:

1. The sequence of consumption and saving decisions \( \{ C_t, D_t, K^h_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) solves the problem of the representative household, ie eq. (B.1)-(B.3).

2. The sequence of portfolio choices \( \{ k_t, b_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) and liability structure \( \{ d_t, e_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) solves the problem of the representative bank, ie eq. (B.7)-(B.10).

3. The sequence of input choices \( \{ K_t, L_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) solves the problem of the representative firm, ie eq. (B.11)-(B.12).

4. The sequence of portfolio choices \( \{ B^f_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) solves the problem of the representative international investor, ie eq. (B.16).

5. The sequence of prices \( \{ v_t, R^d_t, R^b_t, r^k_t, w_t \}_{t=0,1,...} \) clears the equity market, the deposits market, the physical capital market and the labor market, ie eq. (B.17)-(B.21).

6. The sequence of endogenous state variables \( \{ N_{t+1}, E_{t+1}, B_{t+1} \}_{t=0,1,...} \) satisfies the respective laws of motion, ie eq. (B.4), (B.5) and (B.13).
C Solution method

The model is solved using global solution methods. In particular, the method used is policy function iteration (Coleman, 1990), also known as time iteration (Judd, 1998). Functions are approximated using piecewise linear interpolation, as advocated in Richter, Throckmorton and Walker (2014). A sketch of the numerical solution procedure is as follows:

1. Discretize the state variables by creating an evenly space grid, covering the relevant range of values each of them can take.

2. Select the set of policy functions. In this case, the variables chosen are $C(S)$, $b(S)$, $v(S)$, $R^d(S)$, $R^h(S)$.

3. Specify an initial guess for the policy functions at each point $i$ of the state space (note that the size of the state space equals the product of all the state variable grids’ sizes) and use them as candidate policy functions.

4. For each point $i$ of the state space, plug the candidate policy functions into the equilibrium equations and calculate the value of the endogenous state variables at $t+1$.

5. Using the value of the endogenous state variables at $t+1$, use linear interpolation to obtain the value of the policy variables at $t+1$ for each possible realization of the exogenous state variables.

6. Using the value of the endogenous state variables and the policy variables at $t+1$, obtain the value at $t+1$ of the remaining variables necessary to calculate time $t$ expectations, for each possible realization of the aggregate shocks.

7. Use a numerical root-finder to solve for the zeros of the residual equations, subject to each of the remaining equilibrium conditions. Numerical integration is needed at this step to compute expectations in the equilibrium equations. The result is a set of policy values in each point $i$ of the state space that satisfies the equilibrium system of equations up to a specified tolerance level, which characterizes the updated policy function for the next step.

8. If the distance between the candidate policy function and the updated policy values obtained in the previous step is less than the convergence criterion for all $i$, then the policies have converged to their equilibrium values. Otherwise, use the updated policy functions as the new candidate and go back to step 5.
D Accuracy of the numerical solution

It is possible to assess the accuracy of the numerical solution by computing the residual errors of the equilibrium equations after simulating the model for a given sequence of the aggregate shocks using the approximated policy functions obtained by the numerical procedure described above, as proposed by Judd (1992). To this end, the model is simulated for 200,000 periods. Following standard practice, the decimal log of the absolute value of these residual errors is reported here. Figure B.1 reports the density (histogram) of these errors.

Figure D.1: Equilibrium equations’ residual errors