

# Andreas Stegmann

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**Contact Information** CEMFI  
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**Research Interests** Political Economy, Economic Development

**Education**

<i>Ph.D.</i> in Economics CEMFI, Madrid, Spain	09/2015 - 06/2019 (expected)
<i>Visiting Ph.D. student</i> in Economics MIT, Cambridge, USA Host: Ben Olken	02/2017 - 06/2017
<i>Master</i> , Economics and Finance CEMFI, Madrid, Spain	09/2013 - 07/2015
<i>B.Sc.</i> , Economics & Business Administration Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany	10/2009 - 04/2013
<i>Fall Exchange Program</i> , Wharton School of Business University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA	09/2011 - 12/2011

**Research Experience**

- Research Assistant* to Prof. Monica Martinez-Bravo, CEMFI, 2015 - present
- Research Assistant* to Prof. Rafael Repullo, CEMFI, Summer 2014
- Research Assistant* to Prof. Horst Entorf, Goethe University, 2012 - 2013

**Teaching Experience**

- Teaching Assistant*, Graduate Development Economics, CEMFI, Spring 2018
- Teaching Assistant*, Graduate Development Economics, CEMFI, Spring 2017
- Teaching Assistant*, Graduate Development Economics, CEMFI, Spring 2016

## Publications

“The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture:  
Evidence from Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia” (2017)  
(with Monica Martinez-Bravo and Priya Mukherjee)  
*Econometrica* , November 2017, 85 (6), 1991-2010

*Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted*

*in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that the way in which democratic transitions unfold is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random variation that originated during the Indonesian transition: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium-run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.*

## Working Papers

“In Vaccines we Trust? The Effects of Anti-vaccine Propaganda on Immunization: Evidence from Pakistan”  
(with Monica Martinez-Bravo)

*In July 2011, the Pakistani public unexpectedly learnt that the CIA had conducted a fake vaccination campaign as part of the operations to capture Osama Bin Laden. This episode was extensively used by Taliban groups to discredit the health system and vaccination campaigns. We implement a Difference-in-Differences strategy to document the effect of the disclosure of this information on demand for health services. We use survey data to compare vaccination rates before and after the disclosure of this information, across regions with different levels of electoral support for Islamist groups. Our results suggest that the disclosure of information on the fake vaccination campaign had a substantial negative effect on immunization rates: a one standard deviation increase in support for Islamist groups lead to a 9 to 13% decline in immunization rates over the sample mean. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the disclosure of the vaccination ruse eroded the degree of trust in medical services, and consequently, lead parents to actively refuse the use of formal medicine and vaccines, in particular.*

Status: Under Review.

## Selected Work in Progress

“Improving Accountability through Information and Collective Action: Field Experiment in the context of the Village Law reform in Indonesia”  
(with Monica Martinez-Bravo)

*A large literature in political economy documents that formal venues of community participation may not be enough to deliver bottom-up accountability. (Olken 2007, Acemoglu and Robinson 2009, Pande 2011). Poorly informed voters, elite capture, and free riding issues are some of the pitfalls that may prevent citizens from holding*

*the local officials accountable for their performance. The underlying factor in many of these pitfalls is a failure of communities to solve their collective action problem. While an extensive theoretical literature has studied collective action, we have very limited empirical evidence on the determinants of collective action and its effect on local accountability. The aim of this project is to use a randomized controlled trial, in the context of Indonesia after the recent village-law reform in 2014, to evaluate different types of interventions that have the potential to facilitate collective action and, hence, improve local accountability.*

Status: Awarded J-PAL SEA IRF exploratory funding. Pilot completed.

<b>Scholarships and Grants</b>	<i>J-PAL SEA</i> Exploratory Grant (51,000\$)	2016 - 2017
	<i>CEMFI</i> Ph.D. Scholarship	2015 - 2019
	<i>Spatial Spikes</i> Scholarship	2015 - 2016
	ERC Advanced Grant number 269868	
	Principal Investigator: Diego Puga	
	<i>CEMFI</i> Master in Economics and Finance Scholarship	2013 - 2015
	<i>Fellow</i> of the German National Academic Foundation	2012 - 2015
<i>PROMOS</i> Scholarship, German Academic Exchange Service	Fall 2011	
<b>Conferences Presentations</b>	IEA World Congress 2017, Mexico	
	NEUDC 2016, MIT Sloan	
<b>International Visits</b>	J-PAL South-East Asia (SEA) Jakarta, Indonesia	May & October 2017
	International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) Mumbai, India	June 2016
	Center for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP) Lahore, Pakistan	May 2016
<b>Professional Experience</b>	<i>Internship</i> Macroeconomic Research Department, Dekabank, Frankfurt, Germany	04/2012 - 06/2012
<b>Languages</b>	German (Native), English (Fluent), Spanish & French (Conversational Level)	
<b>Computer Skills</b>	Stata, Matlab, ArcGIS, QGIS.	
<b>Citizenship</b>	German	

## References

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