The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents

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Abstract

It has been commonly argued that the decision of a large number of inventors to license complementary patents necessary for the development of a product leads to excessively large royalties. This well-known Cournot-complements or royalty-stacking effect would hurt efficiency and downstream competition. In this paper we show that when we consider patent litigation and introduce heterogeneity in the portfolio of different firms these results change substantially due to what we denote the Inverse Cournot effect. We show that the lower the total royalty that a downstream producer pays, the lower the royalty that patent holders restricted by the threat of litigation of downstream producers will charge. This effect generates a moderation force in the royalty that unconstrained large patent holders will charge that may overturn some of the standard predictions in the literature. Interestingly, though, this effect can be less relevant when all patent portfolios are weak making royalty stacking more important.

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1 Introduction

The fundamental nature of the patent system is under debate among claims on whether it fosters or hurts innovation. The main concerns focus on the impact of patent enforcement in the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) industry. ICT products, such as laptops, tablets, or smartphones, use a variety of technologies covered by complementary patents. The royalties that must be paid for multiple patented technologies in a single product added together are said to form a harmful “royalty stack” (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007). This in turn is claimed to result in excessively high end-product prices and a reduction in the incentives to invest and innovate in product markets.

The arguments supporting royalty stacking and the need for a profound reform of the patent system rely on theoretical models which reformulate the well-known Cournot-complements problem in a licensing framework. Cournot (1838) showed that consumers are better off when all products complementary from a demand viewpoint are produced and marketed by a single firm. In industries where each single product is covered by multiple patents, a patent holder considering the royalty to charge may not fully take into account that an increase in this royalty is likely to result in a cumulative royalty rate that may be too high according to other licensors, the licensees, and their customers. Since this negative externality (or Cournot effect) is ignored by all patent holders, the royalty stack may prove inefficiently high. For this reason, papers such as Lerner and Tirole (2004) have argued that “patent pools”, which consolidate complementary patent rights into a single bundle, are generally welfare enhancing.

The Cournot effect also explains current concerns with the emergence of “patent privateers,” firms that spin off patents for others to assert them. Lemley and Melamed (2013) argue that “patent reformers and antitrust authorities should worry less about aggregation of patent rights and more about disaggregation of those rights, sometimes accomplished by spinning them out to others.” Similarly, “patent trolls” or “patent
assertion entities” (PAEs) - i.e. patent owners whose primary business is to enforce patents to collect royalties - are accused of imposing disproportionate litigation costs and extracting excessive patent royalties and damage awards because the existing patent system allows them to leverage even relatively small portfolios of “weak patents.”¹ The America Invents Act (AIA) enacted by the US Congress in 2011 was designed in part to deal with the problems created by trolls.

The controversy about the empirical relevance of royalty stacking, or about the economic implications of the activity of patent trolls, is raging. It is, therefore, puzzling the absence of (clear-cut) evidence in support of royalty stacking given that the theoretical foundations of this hypothesis have remained unchallenged. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Ericsson v D. Link stated: “The best word to describe [the] royalty stacking argument is theoretical.”²

In this paper we develop a model of licensing complementary innovations under the threat of litigation that explains the circumstances under which royalty stacking is likely to be a problem in practice. This model departs from the extant literature in only one natural dimension; we assume that manufacturers of products covered by multiple patented technologies may challenge in court the patents that cover these products and, crucially, the likelihood that a judge rules in favor of the patent holder is increasing in the number and quality of its patents. This assumption is reasonable. Downstream manufacturers commonly challenge the validity of the patents that cover their products when they litigate in court the licensing terms offered by patent holders. Patent holders with large and high quality patent portfolios will not be constrained by the threat of litigation when setting royalty rates. On the contrary, owners of weak portfolios will have to moderate their royalty claims in order to avoid litigation over patent validity.

¹A weak patent is defined as a patent that may well be invalid, but nobody knows for sure without conclusive litigation (see Llobet (2003) and Farrell and Shapiro (2008)).
More interestingly, our analysis shows that the ability of a patent owner to charge a high royalty without triggering litigation depends on the aggregate royalty charged by all other patent holders: the higher that aggregate rate, the higher the royalty that any patent holder can charge. The intuition is that when the aggregate rate is high the expected gains from invalidating the portfolio of a patent holder are less likely to compensate for the costs incurred by the licensee. This positive relationship is a novel effect that we denote as the *Inverse Cournot effect* and we show that it is very general. This effect provides incentives for unconstrained patent holders (i.e. with strong portfolios) to cut down their royalty rates to force patent holders with weak portfolios to charge, in turn, lower royalties or else face litigation. In so doing, the Inverse Cournot effect becomes a moderating force, offsetting the royalty-stacking problem that arises from the Cournot effect.

This channel becomes less effective, however, among patent holders with weak patent portfolios. To illustrate that, we consider the case in which a licensee decides to litigate patent holders in an endogenous sequence. In that case, it is still true that by lowering the royalty rate a patent holder can trigger litigation against other patent holders. This litigation has further consequences, though. Because when the portfolio of a patentee is invalidated the aggregate royalty rate goes down, the incentives for the downstream producer to litigate the remaining patentees become stronger. As a result of this *litigation cascade*, when a patent holder considers now whether to lower the royalty rate or not it ought to anticipate that, although it might benefit from a smaller royalty stack through an increase in sales, there is a greater probability of itself being litigated. Such a countervailing force implies that the Inverse Cournot effect is more important when patent holdings are more skewed – meaning that patent holders with weak portfolios co-exist with those with strong ones – leading to a lower royalty rate. As a result, we show that the royalty-stacking problem might be mitigated when facing asymmetric but stronger

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3 We use this term to denote a positive externality among owners of complementary inputs (in this case patents) in contrast to the standard Cournot effect which reflects a negative externality.
patent holders compared to the case of weak but more similar ones.

The model also has implications for other relevant aspects of the discussion regarding standard-setting organizations (SSOs). In those organizations a large number of innovators hold patents that are essential for the development of technologies that are compatible with a standard. These patent holders commit to license their patents according to Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. We show that accounting for these commitments and the interpretation that courts could make of them does not alter the main results in the paper. However, some recent court decisions aimed at curtailing the power of some patent holders and, thus, address royalty stacking, might have actually made the royalty-stacking problem worse.

We also discuss how the results of our paper affect the incentives for firms to consolidate their patent holdings either through mergers or patent pools. We argue that patent pools (or mergers) among large patent holders are likely to have the positive effects emphasized in the literature. However, mergers that involve small patent holders, motivated in part by the aim to improve the power of their joint power in court, might make the royalty-stacking problem worse. In fact, it could be the case that the total royalty rate increases as a result of the creation of a patent pool.

We start by introducing in section 2 a very stylized model that delivers the main insights of the paper. As we discuss in section 3, however, the mechanism driving the results is very general and similar implications can be drawn in a more general setup, although at the cost of much greater complexity. In section 4 we relate the results of this paper to the debate on patent pools and patent aggregation.

1.1 Literature Review

The literature on SSOs, in works like Lemley and Shapiro (2007), has emphasized that the licensing of complementary and essential patents by many developers could give raise to a royalty-stacking problem. This is not, however, a general result. Spulber (2016)
shows that when upstream firms sell quantities but negotiate royalty rates the cooperative outcome will emerge.

Our paper is also related to a long literature on the litigation between a patent holder and firms that might have infringed its patents, including papers like Llobet (2003) and Farrell and Shapiro (2008). More recent works have aimed to capture the interaction of these conflicts in contexts like SSOs analyzing the litigation between producers and Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs). This is the case, for example, of Choi and Gerlach (2015a) that studies the information externalities that arise when a NPE sequentially litigates against several producers.

The papers closest to ours are Choi and Gerlach (2016) and Bourreau et al. (2015). The former studies the incentives for firms to acquire patent portfolios as a function of existing patent holdings of the different firms. In the latter, the authors study licensing and litigation in SSOs, as well as the decisions of firms to sell their IP to other innovators. The main important difference with our paper, however, is that in their setup litigation occurs after production has taken place. As a result, the total quantity produced does not depend on the outcome of this litigation and the damages paid for infringement are constant. This assumption severs the link between the licensing decision of different patent holders, eliminating the Inverse Cournot effect that plays a crucial role in our model. In their paper the strategic interaction arises from free-entry and market competition.

Finally, our paper is related to the literature on patent pools. Lerner and Tirole (2004) devise a mechanism to weed out welfare-decreasing patent pools that include substitute patents and might induce collusion from welfare-increasing ones that include only complements. This mechanism consists in allowing upstream firms to license their patents together and separately. This rule leads to a unique equilibrium only when there are two patent holders. Boutin (2015) provides additional conditions on independent licensing to guarantee that there exists a unique equilibrium in which welfare-decreasing

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4Lerner and Tirole (2015) generalizes the previous argument to SSOs.
pools will not emerge. Rey and Tirole (2013) show that if we allow for tacit coordination independent licensing might not be enough to screen patent pools formed by substitutes. Our work contributes to this literature by showing that even if we restrict ourselves to complementary patents, patent pools may not increase welfare when they essentially include small or litigation-constrained patent holders which increase their chances in court when they bundle their patents, making royalty stacking more harmful. Choi and Gerlach (2015b) develop a model of patent litigation of weak patent holders and endogenous pool formation that delivers a similar insight. In their model, however, the interaction between large and small patent holders outside the pool is absent.

2 The Model

Consider a market in which a downstream monopolist, firm $D$, sells a good to a unique consumer with a unit demand for the product. With probability $\alpha$ the valuation for this unit is 1. With probability $1 - \alpha$ the valuation is $v < 1$.

The production of the good requires firm $D$ to use the technologies of $N = 2$ different pure upstream firms. Upstream firm $i$ holds a portfolio of $x_i$ patents relevant for its own technology, for $i = 1, 2$, with $x_1 \geq x_2$. Each patent holder charges a per-unit royalty $r_i$ to license the necessary patents to make use of that technology.\footnote{As pointed out in Llobet and Padilla (2016) royalty-stacking problems are aggravated under per-unit royalties compared to the more frequent ad-valorem royalties, based on firm revenue. However, assuming ad-valorem royalties in this model should lead, qualitatively, to the same results.} We denote the total royalty rate as $R \equiv r_1 + r_2$. We assume that there is no further cost of production so that the marginal cost of the final product is also equal to $R$.

The royalty rate for technology $i$ is set by patent holder $i$ as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The downstream producer, however, might challenge in court the patents that cover the technology. Litigation between the downstream monopolist and any upstream patent holder involves legal costs $L_D$ and $L_U$, respectively. The success in court is based on the size of the portfolio of the patent holder. In particular, the probability that a judge
rules in favor of patent holder $i$, denoted as $g(x_i)$, is assumed to be increasing in $x_i$. This assumption can be justified on several grounds. First, one of the most common ways for a downstream producer to dispute in court the licensing terms offered is to challenge the validity of the patents that cover the technology. This strategy is less likely to succeed if the patent portfolio is larger and/or the patents are more valuable. Second, patent holders do not typically defend their technology with all their patent portfolio but, rather, they choose the patents that are most likely to be upheld in court or that are more relevant for the disputed application. It is more likely to find a suitable patent for litigation if choosing from a larger patent portfolio. Finally, the model is isomorphic to one in which each upstream patent holder $i$ holds a unique patent of quality (or a number of patents of weighted quality) $x_i$. To the extent that more substantial innovations translate into stronger patents, we can interpret the increasing function $g(x)$ as a reflection of this relationship.\footnote{For simplicity we abstract from situations in which upstream patent holders own the rights for technologies that might be infringed by other upstream patent holders. We are also abstracting from litigation arising due to the non-payment of the obligations related to the license. That case would entail lower litigation costs and, for simplicity, we assume that as a result the patent holder would always sue if the payment is not made.}

As we discuss later, the downstream producer can also choose to litigate more than one patent holder, in an endogenous sequence. We assume that when indifferent the downstream producer prefers not to litigate.

The timing of the model is described in Figure 1. First, upstream patent holders simultaneously choose their royalty rates. In the second stage the downstream producer...
chooses which patentees to litigate (if any) and the sequence. In the final stage, once litigation has been resolved, the valuation of the consumer is drawn and the downstream producer chooses the price for the final good.

The timing of the model implies that the downstream producer will always choose a price equal to the realized valuation of the consumer. That is, given $R$ the downstream producer captures all the surplus without generating the losses associated to double marginalization.\(^7\) As a result, expected downstream profits $\Pi_D$ can be computed as

$$
\Pi_D(R) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha + (1 - \alpha)v - R & \text{if } R \leq v, \\
\alpha(1 - R) & \text{if } R \in (v, 1], \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

Notice that these profits are decreasing and convex in $R$. These are general properties that engender many of the results of the paper as we will see in section 3.

We now characterize the equilibrium of the game depending on the strength of the patent portfolio of each firm. We start with the case in which the parameters imply that litigation never plays a role in the model. This assumption will give rise to the standard royalty-stacking result in the literature that we reproduce next.

### 2.1 Large Patent Portfolios

Suppose that both patent holders have a portfolio sufficiently strong so that $g(x_1) = g(x_2) = 1$.\(^8\) In this case, litigation by the downstream producer will never be a credible threat. We start by characterizing the royalty rate that maximizes joint profits for the upstream patent holders. This royalty will be used as a benchmark for the case in which patent holders choose their royalty rate independently.

**Lemma 1.** The aggregate royalty rate that maximizes total patent holder profits is $R^M = v$ if $v \geq \alpha$ and $R^M = 1$ otherwise.

\(^7\)A dead-weight loss would arise if we assumed that the downstream producer chose the price before the demand is realized. In that case, the threshold value on $R$ in the profit function $\Pi_D(R)$ would change. That is, $p^M(R) = v$ if and only if $R \leq \tilde{R} \equiv \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} < v$. Since double-marginalization does not interact with the mechanisms explored in this paper, the main results would go through under this alternative assumption although at the cost of more technical complexity.

\(^8\)The same results would arise if, instead, we assumed that $L_D$ is sufficiently high.
The more likely the demand is equal to $v$ (which occurs with probability $1 - \alpha$) or the higher is $v$, the more likely it is that it is profitable for the patent holders to cater all the demand by choosing a low royalty rate. Notice also that due to the unit-inelastic demand, the royalty $R = v$ also maximizes total social welfare.

We now turn to the situation in which firms choose their royalty rate independently. As in the previous case, it is easy to see that any undominated Nash equilibrium should involve royalties $r_1$ and $r_2$ such that $r_1 + r_2$ are either equal to $v$ or to $1$.

**Proposition 2.** There is a continuum of pure strategy equilibria. The corresponding royalty rates $(r^u_1, r^u_2)$ can be characterized as follows

1. If $v \geq \frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha}$, $R^u = r^u_1 + r^u_2 = v$ with $r^u_i \leq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ for $i = 1, 2$.
2. If $v \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{2}$, $R^u = r^u_1 + r^u_2 = 1$ with $r^u_i \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ for $i = 1, 2$.

Both kinds of equilibria co-exist when $\frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha} \leq v \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{2}$.

Intuitively, the equilibrium with total royalty of 1 is likely to exist when $v$ is small and $\alpha$ is sufficiently close to 1. A deviation might exist if any patent holder prefers to decrease the royalty rate in order to cater the consumer regardless of her valuation. This deviation is illustrated in Figure 2. Given $r^u_2$, patent holder 1 can choose to stick with $r^u_1 = 1 - r^u_2$ or deviate and choose $\hat{r}_1 = v - r^u_2$ so that the probability of selling increases from $\alpha$ to 1. Such a deviation is unprofitable if $r^u_2$ is sufficiently large and, thus, the low $\hat{r}_1$ does not allow the firm to benefit from the increase in sales. In the limit, when $v = 0$ or $\alpha = 1$ this equilibrium holds for any combination of royalties that sum up to 1.

Similarly, equilibria with a total royalty equal to $R^u = v$ are likely to exist when $v$ is sufficiently high and $\alpha$ is sufficiently small. This time a deviation aims to capture the additional surplus when consumer valuation is 1, even if this surplus is materialized only with probability $\alpha$. To prevent these deviations each patent holder must charge a modest
royalty so that the other firm already obtains sufficiently high profits in equilibrium, thus reducing the appeal of raising the royalty rate and reducing the probability of sale. In the limit, when \( v = 1 \) or \( \alpha = 0 \) any combination of royalties that sum up to \( v \) would constitute an equilibrium.

The next result shows that the equilibrium total royalty – and the corresponding final-good price – might be higher than in the case in which royalties were chosen by a monopolist. In other words, there are values of \( v \) for which patent holders would separately induce a total royalty \( R^u = 1 \) and the final price would become \( p^M(R^u) = 1 \) and yet they would benefit from coordinating and choosing a royalty rate \( R^M = v \), leading to a final price \( p^M(R^u) = v \).

**Corollary 3 (Royalty Stacking).** When \( \alpha < v \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{2} \) inefficient equilibria with \( r_1^u + r_2^u = R^u = 1 \) exist even though total profits are maximized when the total royalty is equal to \( v \). When \( \alpha \leq v < \frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha} \), all equilibria lead to \( R^u = 1 \). However, there are no parameter values for which \( R^M = 1 \) but \( R^u = v \).

This is a version of the Cournot-complements result, in which firms choosing quantities of complementary products engender final prices even higher than the monopoly one. The intuition has already been discussed in the context of patent licensing and it has been
referred to, in papers like Lemley and Shapiro (2007), as the royalty-stacking problem. The decision of a patent holder to increase the royalty rate trades off the higher margin with the lower quantity sold but without internalizing the fact that this decrease in quantity has a negative effect on the royalty revenues of the other patent holder.

This result holds for a generic number of firms and under general assumptions regarding the demand functions and it emerges whenever litigation is irrelevant, as the previous literature has implicitly assumed.\textsuperscript{10} As a result, whereas the profit-maximizing rate is independent of the number of firms (or the number of patents), in the equilibrium we have that the royalty-stacking problem becomes more severe when the total number of patents is fragmented in the hands of more firms. Also importantly, if litigation is irrelevant, meaning that patents are always enforced, the size of a patent portfolio also becomes irrelevant and each patent holder should charge the same royalty rate. This prediction, however, seems quite implausible in practice.

We now discuss the effects of the litigation threat. We analyze two prototypical situations. First, we consider the case in which only one patentee is constrained by this threat. Later we study the situation in which both patentees are equally constrained.

\textbf{2.2 One Constrained Patent Holder}

Suppose that \( g(x_1) = 1 \) and \( g(x_2) < 1 \) so that the downstream producer may only be interested in litigating patent holder 2. Consider the case where \( v \in (\alpha, \frac{1+\alpha}{2}] \) so that in the previous benchmark without litigation a combination of royalties for which \( r_1^* + r_2^* = 1 \) constituted an equilibrium with royalty stacking.

When litigation is feasible, the first additional condition that \( r_2^* \) must satisfy is that

\[
(1 - g(x_2)) \left[ \Pi_D (1 - r_2^*) - \Pi_D(1) \right] \leq L_D.
\]

That is, it is not profitable for the downstream producer to go to court against patentee

\textsuperscript{10}As we discuss in section 3, a sufficient condition is the log-concavity of the demand function. This condition guarantees that the patent holder’s problem is concave and also that royalty rates become strategic substitutes, which is enough for this result to arise.
2. In this expression the downstream firm trades off the legal costs, $L_D$, with the increase in profits when the portfolio of patent holder 2 is invalidated and its royalty goes to zero. Portfolio invalidation occurs with probability $1 - g(x_2)$ and it increases profits from $\Pi_D(1)$ to $\Pi_D(1 - r_2^*)$. Using (1) we have that $\Pi_D(1) = 0$, $\Pi_D(1 - r_2^*) = \alpha r_2^*$ if $1 - r_2^* \geq v$, and $\Pi_D(1 - r_2^*) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - v) - (1 - r_2^*)$ if $1 - r_2^* < v$, meaning that the previous condition will hold if $r_2^*$ is sufficiently small. In particular, litigation against patent holder 2 is unprofitable given $r_1^* + r_2^* = 1$ if

$$r_2^* \leq \tilde{r}_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{L_D}{\alpha(1 - g(x_2))} & \text{if } \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \alpha(1 - v), \\ \frac{L_D}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - v)} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Combinations of royalties resulting in values of $r_2^* = 1 - r_1^*$ sufficiently high, will not constitute an equilibrium when $L_U$ is large since patente 2 will prefer to lower the royalty rate and avoid going to court. If $L_U$ is small the portfolio of patentee 2 will be invalidated with probability $g(x_2)$, meaning that even if $r_2^* = 1 - r_1^*$, the total expected royalty will also be smaller than 1.

The previous argument presents a sufficient but not necessary condition to rule out some equilibria with royalty stacking. In particular, suppose that both patent holders choose a royalty rate higher than $\frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$, so that the conditions that guarantee an equilibrium with $R = 1$ in Proposition 2 are satisfied, and equation (2) holds, so that the downstream producer is not interested in litigating patent holder 2. As we discuss next, there might still be strategic considerations that compel patentee 1 to deviate and choose an alternative royalty rate $\hat{r}_1$ that induces litigation against the other patentee, leading to a reduction in the total royalty rate. In particular, given $r_2$ patentee 2 will be litigated if $\hat{r}_1 \leq \tilde{r}_1(r_2)$, implicitly determined by

$$(1 - g(x_2)) [\Pi_D(\tilde{r}_1) - \Pi_D(\tilde{r}_1 + r_2)] = L_D. \quad (4)$$

Replacing the profit function of the downstream producer we have that

$$\hat{r}_1(r_2) = v + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} r_2 - \frac{L_D}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2))} \text{ if } r_2 < r_2 \leq \tilde{r}_2, \quad (5)$$
where $\bar{r}_1(r_2) \leq v$ and $\bar{r}_2$ is defined in (3). It is important to point out that if the royalty rate of patentee 2 is sufficiently low, defined as $r_2 < r_2^* = \begin{cases} \frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} v & \text{if } \frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} \leq v \\ \frac{1-g(x_2)}{\alpha(1-g(x_2))} - \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} v & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$ (6) even a royalty $\hat{r}_1 = 0$ is not enough to induce litigation by the downstream producer since the gain from invalidating these patents is smaller than the legal costs involved. For higher values of $r_2$ litigation against patentee 2 arises for $\hat{r}_1$ sufficiently small. The threshold value $\bar{r}_1(r_2)$ is weakly increasing in $r_2$ and weakly decreasing in $L_D$. The positive relationship between $r_2$ and $\bar{r}_1$ makes royalty rates strategic complements. Suppose now that patent holder 1 chooses a royalty rate $\hat{r}_1 < \bar{r}_1(r_2)$ so that the downstream producer has incentives to litigate the other patentee. This threat has a moderating effect on patent holder 2 which can avoid litigation by lowering $r_2$. We call this mechanism the Inverse Cournot effect. This is one of the main insights of this paper and it constitutes the reason why an equilibrium with royalty stacking might fail to arise in the presence of a litigation threat. As we discuss later, this relationship is very general and it applies to demand functions of all classes and to a generic number of firms.

Following the previous argument, patent holder 1 might benefit from a royalty rate $\hat{r}_1$ below $\bar{r}_1$ only if, by causing litigation against patentee 2, it induces an expansion in the quantity sold from $\alpha$ to 1 with probability $1 - g(x_2)$. Hence, $\hat{r}_1$ must be lower than $v$. Since $\bar{r}_1(\bar{r}_2) \leq v$ it follows that the optimal deviation for patent holder 1 when patentee 2 sets $r_2^* \leq \bar{r}_2$ is the highest royalty rate which guarantees that patentee 2 is litigated, $\hat{r}_1 = \bar{r}_1(r_2^*)$. Patent holder 1’s profits in that case would become

$$\hat{\Pi}_1 = [\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2))] \hat{r}_1.$$ (7)

That is, a deviation will lead to profits equal to $\hat{r}_1$ either because the valuation of the consumer is 1 or because the valuation is $v$ but patent holder 2 is successfully litigated by the downstream producer. This deviation will not take place if profits, $\hat{\Pi}_1$, are lower than those in the candidate equilibrium, $\Pi_1^* = \alpha r_1^*$. Notice that the lower are $r_1^*$ or $g(x_2)$
the more binding this condition becomes. The next proposition shows the circumstances under which it is not possible to have $\Pi^*_1 \geq \hat{\Pi}_1$ while, at the same time $r^*_2 \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$, as Proposition 2 requires. In those situations, an equilibrium with royalty stacking may fail to exist.

**Proposition 4.** Suppose that $v > \alpha$. If $\frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} < \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ there is no pure strategy equilibrium with royalty stacking. However, if $L_U$ is sufficiently high the efficient equilibrium always exists and it involves $r^*_2 \leq \frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} < v$ and $r^*_1 = v - r^*_2$.

The previous result indicates that when $L_D$ and/or $g(x_2)$ are sufficiently low, royalty stacking will not arise in equilibrium. This result implies that in instances in which a monopolist patent holder prefers to choose a royalty $R^M = v$ – that is, when $v > \alpha$ – there would be no equilibrium with $R^* = 1$.

In order to interpret this result it is useful to start by considering the case under which such an equilibrium exists. The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the combinations of $r_1$ and $r_2$ that induce litigation against patentee 2. From (6) we know that if $r^*_2 \leq \frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)}$ the Inverse Cournot effect has no bite since there is no positive value of $\hat{r}_1$ that triggers litigation. Thus, when $\frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ it is also possible to find $r^*_2 \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$, satisfying the conditions of Proposition 2. Hence, in that case it is optimal for patent holder 1 to choose $r^*_1 = 1 - r^*_2$ and an equilibrium with royalty stacking will arise in that case.

Our proposition shows that the condition $\frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ is not only sufficient but also necessary for a royalty-stacking equilibrium to exist. In other words, consider a combination of royalties $(r^*_1, r^*_2)$ with $r^*_1 + r^*_2 = 1$ such that $r^*_i \geq \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ for $i = 1, 2$. If $r^*_2 \geq \bar{r}_2$, we know that patent holder 2 is litigated in equilibrium since, as seen in the figure, $r^*_1 = 1 - r^*_2 < \bar{r}_1(r^*_2)$. If, instead, $r^*_2 \leq \bar{r}_2$ so that $r^*_1 \geq \bar{r}_1(r^*_2)$ the previous proposition indicates that patent holder 1 could always increase profits by lowering the royalty rate – and choose $\hat{r}_1$ as indicated in the figure – and, due to the Inverse Cournot effect, to provide incentives for the downstream producer to litigate patent holder 2. The reason for this result is, precisely, that when $v > \alpha$ total profits increase when there is
no royalty stacking and patentee 1 expects to appropriate this increase in total surplus.

The second part of the proposition also indicates that when the litigation cost is high for patentee 2 (large $L_U$) two results concur. First, the royalty that each firm can charge is commensurate to the strength of the patent portfolio and the cost of challenging those rights by the downstream producer, $r_2^* \leq \frac{L_U}{1-g(x_2)}$. This result arises from the fact that when $g(x_2)$ is small patentee 2 must choose a low royalty rate to prevent the downstream producer from engaging in costly litigation. Second, and more interestingly, the profit maximizing equilibrium $R^M = v$ always exists. The reason is that the low $r_2^*$ is optimal for patent holder 2 because a deviation in this case, which implies an increase in the royalty rate, is met by costly litigation with positive probability due to the high value of $L_U$. At the same time, the low value of $r_2$ makes patent holder 1 the residual claimant of the surplus generated. This can be seen using Figure 2, where we can show that when $r_2$ is low patent holder 1 internalizes the losses that a deviation towards a larger royalty rate entails.

The existence of an equilibrium without royalty stacking is restricted in the proposition to the case in which $L_U$ is sufficiently large so that no litigation arises. However, notice that if litigation occurred in equilibrium and, as a result, patent holder 2’s port-
folio were invalidated with probability $1 - g(x_2)$ the expected royalty rate would be, by definition, lower than 1 and royalty stacking would also be mitigated.

### 2.3 Two Constrained Patent Holders

Suppose now that both firms have identical patent holdings which do not confer full protection against litigation, $g(x_1) = g(x_2) = g(x) < 1$. As in the previous case we focus on the situation in which royalty stacking was an equilibrium when no litigation was feasible, $\alpha < v \leq \frac{1+\alpha}{2}$. As opposed to what happened in the previous case, litigation here might involve one or both upstream patent holders. We assume that litigation occurs in sequence and this sequence is chosen by the downstream producer. Importantly, the decision of whether to litigate a second patent holder or not might be contingent on the first court decision.

As in the previous case, we study whether litigation affects the existence of an equilibrium with royalty stacking, so that $r_1^* + r_2^* = 1$. For the purpose of presenting the results in this section it is enough to focus on the symmetric case in which $r_1^* = r_2^* = \frac{1}{2}$ as if this equilibrium did not exist no asymmetric equilibrium would exist either.\footnote{As discussed in previous sections, an equilibrium may fail to exist because one of the royalties is too low and, as a result, either the patent holder decides to deviate and raise it even at the cost of being litigated or the other patent holder may benefit from lowering its own royalty and serve the whole market. By focusing in the symmetric royalty rate we are minimizing the profitability of these deviations.}

Suppose first that only patent holder 2 is litigated. Using (2), the expected gain of the downstream producer from going to court, to be compared with the cost $L_D$, is equal to

\[(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) - \Pi_D (1) \right].\]

Suppose now that after patent holder 2 has been litigated the downstream producer is considering whether to also litigate patentee 1 or not. Since litigation is sequential, the decision ought to be contingent on the success in court against patentee 2. If patentee 2 prevails, the expected gains from another trial are identical to the ones described above. This implies that if litigating patentee 2 only were profitable, litigating patentee 1 after the downstream producer had been defeated in court in the first stage would be equally
Suppose now that patentee 2 lost in court, which occurs with probability $1 - g(x)$. The expected profits of the downstream producer of litigating against patentee 1 are now evaluated when $r_2 = 0$ and they would be equal to $(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(1/2) \right]$. Since $\Pi_D(R)$ is convex, $\Pi_D(1/2) - \Pi_D(1) \leq \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(1/2)$. That is, litigating patentee 1 after victory against patentee 2 would always be more profitable than if the downstream producer had lost.

An important implication of this result is that in the symmetric case it will never be optimal to litigate one of the patent holders only. That is, it would also be at least as profitable to litigate the other one. For this reason, when $r^*_1 = r^*_2 = 1/2$, the downstream producer will be interested in going to court against patent holder 2 if and only if

\[
(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(1/2) - \Pi_D(1) \right] + (1 - g(x)) \left[ (1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(1) \right] - L_D \right] > L_D. \tag{8}
\]

The first term in the previous expression is identical to the one that governs the decision to litigate in the case of one constrained patent holder.\textsuperscript{12} The second term, however, is new and it captures the option value that litigation may bring. That is, if the downstream producer wins the first trial the profitability of going to court against the other patent holder increases. We call this effect a litigation cascade.

In order to interpret this constraint it is useful to consider the situation in which the downstream producer is indifferent between engaging in litigation or not. In this scenario, equation (8) implies that litigating patentee 2 only must result in an increase in expected market revenues lower than the cost $L_D$ or, else, litigating both patent holders would lead to strictly positive profits. Since litigation against patentee 2 is unprofitable and the problem the downstream producer faces against patentee 1 is the same when it has not succeeded in court before, it will only litigate a second time upon an initial success. Indifference between going to court or not implies, thus, that the profits from this second trial, which occurs with probability $1 - g(x)$, must compensate the losses from the first

\textsuperscript{12}To make both equations comparable we need to set $r^*_1 = 1/2$ in the latter.
That is, when indifferent between litigating or not, the downstream producer is motivated to litigate only due to the prospect of invalidating the portfolio of both patent holders.

From the previous arguments it is immediate that equation (8) is less tight than the one that drives the decision to litigate patent holder 2 when only this firm is constrained, as illustrated in equation (2). The downstream producer benefits from having the option to litigate against a second patent holder contingent upon the success of the first trial. This comparison would suggest that before we introduce strategic considerations in the patent holders’ royalty choices – that is, before we account for the optimal response of the patent holders to the increased litigation risk associated with that option –, royalty stacking is less likely when they both have a weak portfolio. As we will see next, once we introduce these strategic considerations the opposite may hold.

Suppose that the litigation constraint in (8) is not satisfied and, thus, it is unprofitable for the downstream producer to go to court if patent holders charge a royalty rate \( r_1^* = r_2^* = \frac{1}{2} \). We now consider the incentives for patentee 1 to deviate. In order to simplify the exposition we will consider only the case in which if litigation occurs in equilibrium the downstream producer prefers to start by challenging the portfolio of the patentee with the highest royalty rate. As we prove later in the paper in a more general setup – see Lemma 8 – this order is without loss of generality since it is the one that maximizes profits for the downstream producer and, thus, it is the only relevant situation.

As in the previous case, a necessary condition for a deviation by patentee 1 to be profitable is that it spurs litigation against patentee 2. Because the downstream producer litigates first the patent holder with the highest royalty rate, such a deviation must entail a decrease in \( r_1 \). But now, in spite of the lower royalty, it turns out that patentee 1 might be litigated afterwards. The reason is that although it is not profitable to litigate patent holder 1 initially, it might be worthwhile to do it if and when the downstream producer

\[ \text{Notice that here we are abstracting from the informational spillovers that a court outcome has on future court rulings.} \]
prevails against patentee 2, which occurs with probability $1 - g(x)$.

The next lemma characterizes the threshold values of $\hat{r}_1$ for which patentee 1 expects to be litigated in case patentee 2 loses in court.

**Lemma 5.** Suppose that under $r_1^* = r_2^* = \frac{1}{2}$ it is not profitable for the downstream producer to engage in litigation. If by deviating to $\hat{r}_1 < r_1^*$ patent holder 2 is litigated, patent holder 1 will also be litigated if and only if patent holder 2 lost in court and $\hat{r}_1 > \frac{L_D}{1-g(x)}$.

The previous lemma determines two regions depending on whether a deviation by patent holder 1 spurs a litigation cascade or not. Compared to the case characterized in the previous section in which $g(x_1) = 1$, when patentee 1 is also restricted by the risk of being litigated, a deviation becomes less profitable in both regions, albeit for different reasons. In the first region, in order to elude litigation, patentee 1 must choose $\hat{r}_1$ restricted to be lower than $\frac{L_D}{1-g(x)}$, reducing the royalty revenues that the firm might accrue. In the second region, when $\hat{r}_1$ is higher, the lower profitability of the deviation arises from the probability that the patent holder might not accrue licensing revenues from the portfolio if the court declares it invalid, together with the corresponding litigation costs. In particular, in this region, the profits from a deviation are

$$\hat{\Pi}_1 = g(x)\alpha\hat{r}_1 + (1 - g(x)) [g(x)\hat{r}_1 - L_U].$$

When the patents of the other firm are upheld in court a sale only occurs with probability $\alpha$. When the portfolio of patentee 2 is invalidated, however, the downstream producer also decides to litigate patent holder 1 and the royalty $\hat{r}_1$ is only paid in case of success.

It is easy to see that the risk of a litigation cascade might foster the existence of an equilibrium with royalty stacking. As an illustration, take the case in which $L_U$ is very large, which makes the threat of litigation particularly relevant for the upstream patent holders, and consider the case in which $v \leq \frac{1}{2}$.
Given $r_1^* = r_2^* = 1/2$, two conditions must be satisfied for such an equilibrium to exist. First, the downstream producer must not be interested in litigating if (8) does not hold, which in this case implies

$$\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} \geq \frac{1}{2 - g(x)} \left[g(x)\frac{\alpha}{2} + (1 - g(x)(\alpha + (1 - \alpha)v)\right].$$

(9)

Second, since $L_U$ is large, the cost of a litigation cascade implies that the optimal deviation of patent holder $i$, for $i = 1, 2$, involves $\hat{r}_i = \min\left\{v, \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)}\right\}$ and such a deviation will be unprofitable if and only if $\hat{\Pi}_1 \leq \Pi^*$ or

$$[\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x))]\hat{r}_1 \leq \frac{\alpha}{2}.$$

(10)

Notice that, as in the case of one constrained patent holder $\hat{r}_i \leq v$ so that demand expands if the portfolio of the other patent holder is invalidated.

These two conditions provide a lower and upper bound, respectively, on $\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)}$ for an equilibrium with royalty stacking to exist. That is, the legal costs of the downstream producer must be sufficiently large to discourage this firm from litigating but they must also be sufficiently small so that the decrease in the royalty rate necessary for a deviating firm to fend off litigation is large.

Although the previous conditions are highly non-linear in the main parameters of the model it is easy to see that it is possible to find combinations that satisfy them. More interestingly, we can also find situations in which this equilibrium with a total royalty equal $R^* = 1$ is sustainable when both patent holders have a very large portfolio or when both firms have a small one but not when firms are asymmetric.

**Example 1.** Let’s take the parameter values $\alpha = 0.1$, $v = 0.3$, $g(x_2) = 0.7$, $L_D = 0.035$, and $L_U$ sufficiently large. Clearly, if litigation were not possible, the parameter values would satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2 and an equilibrium with royalty stacking, $R^u = 1$, would exist.

Next, consider the case in which $g(x_1) = 1$ so that only the second patent holder is
potentially constrained. By construction, \( \frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)} < \frac{v-\alpha}{1-\alpha} \) and, according to Proposition 4, the royalty-stacking equilibrium does not exist in this case.

Finally, consider the case in which \( g(x_1) = g(x_2) = 0.7 \). It can be verified that equations (9) and (10) are satisfied and, thus, royalty-stacking equilibrium exists when both patent holders are similarly constrained.

We can, thus, conclude that once we take introduce litigation in the model the royalty rate is not necessarily monotonic in the strength of the patent portfolio. In fact, we have just shown that when portfolios are weaker but patents are more evenly distributed the royalty stacking problem might become worse.

### 3 Robustness of the Results

We now show that the main forces at work in the previous model hold more generally. In particular, we assume a continuously differentiable demand function \( D(p) \).\(^{14}\)

Consider the case of \( N \) patent holders. Each of them sets a royalty rate \( r_i \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, N \), so that \( R = \sum_{i=1}^{N} r_i \). The expression for profits of the downstream producer arises from

\[ \Pi_D(R) = \max_p (p - R)D(p). \]

Standard calculations show that the optimal price \( p^M(R) \) is increasing in \( R \) and, therefore, the profit function is decreasing and convex in \( R \): \( \Pi'_D(R) = -D(p^M) < 0 \) and \( \Pi''_D(R) = -D'(p^M) \frac{dp^M}{dR}(R) > 0. \)

In order to guarantee that the profit function of the patent holders is well-behaved with respect to the royalty rate we introduce the following standard regularity condition.

**Assumption 1.** \( D(p^M(R)) \) is log-concave in \( R \).

\(^{14}\) A minor difference here is the assumption that the downstream producer chooses a unique price and, therefore, an inefficiency due to double marginalization will arise for any price \( p > 0 \). This difference will only have implications in the welfare considerations.
The profits of patent holder $i$ can be defined as

$$\Pi_i(R_{-i}) = \max_{r_i} r_i D\left(p^M \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} r_i\right)\right)$$

where $R_{-i} = \sum_{j\neq i} r_j$. For future reference, we denote the royalty rate that corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium of the game when firms are unconstrained by litigation as $r_i^u = r^u$ for all $i$. It can be obtained from

$$D(p^M(Nr^u)) + r^u D'(p^M(Nr^u)) \frac{dp^M}{dR^u}(Nr^u) = 0.$$ (11)

For completeness, we reproduce the standard royalty-stacking result. It is important to notice that Assumption 1 not only guarantees concavity of the patent holder’s problem but it also implies that royalty rates are strategic substitutes, delivering the result.

**Proposition 6** (Royalty Stacking). *If litigation is sufficiently costly for the downstream producer, in the unique equilibrium of the game all patent holders choose $r_i^u = r^u$, defined by (11), independently of the size of their portfolio. In this equilibrium $r^u(N)$ is decreasing in $N$ but $R^u(N)$ and $p^M(R^u(N))$ are increasing in $N$.*

We now discuss how the two main forces that drive the results in the previous section generalize in this context. We start by talking about the Inverse Cournot effect and we later analyze how the litigation cascades manifests in more general demand setups. For simplicity we return to the $N = 2$ case.

### 3.1 The Inverse Cournot Effect

We first generalize the results of the previous section in the case in which only patentee 2 is constrained by litigation. That is, $g(x_2) < g(x_1) = 1$. As in the benchmark model, the downstream producer prefers not to litigate patentee 2 if and only if

$$\left(1 - g(x_2)\right) [\Pi_D(r_1) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2)] \leq L_D.$$ (12)

Litigation will be unprofitable if the expected gains from avoiding to license the patent portfolio of patentee 2 are lower than the legal costs involved. The highest royalty that
induces litigation against patentee 2, $\bar{r}_1$, is still determined by (4). The next lemma characterizes how this threshold on the royalty rate depends on the parameters of the model.

**Lemma 7.** The downstream producer will litigate patent holder 2 if $r_1 < \bar{r}_1(L_D, x_2, r_2)$, as defined by (4). This threshold royalty $\bar{r}_1$ is strictly increasing in $r_2$ and strictly decreasing in $L_D$ and $x_2$.

This result illustrates that the decision to litigate a patent holder also depends on the royalty rate set by the other patent holder and it generalizes the expression in equation (5) for the benchmark model. Denoted before as the Inverse Cournot effect, it implies that if $r_1$ is high, profits for the downstream producer are low, independently of whether the patents of firm 2 are upheld in court or not. Thus, it is less likely that the gains from litigation offset the legal costs involved. In the benchmark model we showed that this effect is an important counterbalancing force to the conventional Cournot effect and it is, indeed, a reason why a royalty-stacking equilibrium would fail to exist when $\frac{L_D}{1-g(x_2)}$ took an intermediate value. Of course, this effect immediately generalizes to the case of $N$ patent holders with a portfolio sufficiently strong so that they will never be litigated. In that case, the Inverse Cournot effect would indicate that the highest royalty that patentee 2 can charge is increasing in the sum of the royalty of all the other patent holders, denoted as $R_{-2}$.

A direct consequence of this force is that higher legal costs or a stronger portfolio of patentee 2 makes this constraint less relevant. Patentee 1 needs to set an even lower royalty to make litigation against patentee 2 profitable for the downstream producer. As a result, a deviation is less likely to be profitable and royalty stacking is more likely to arise in equilibrium.

In any equilibrium with royalties $r^*_1$ and $r^*_2$ patentee 2 will avoid being litigated if (12) holds. However, this condition also implies that there will never be a Nash Equilibrium in which the downstream producer is indifferent between litigating patentee 2 or not.
The reason is that patentee 1 always has incentives to lower slightly the royalty rate, so that (12) does not hold and induce litigation on patentee 2. At essentially no cost, it becomes, with probability $1 - g(x_2)$, the only firm licensing the technology. This deviation is profitable as it generates a discrete reduction in the royalty stack. A consequence of this insight is that unless $L_D$ is sufficiently high so that the litigation is irrelevant and, as a result, $r_1^* = r_2^* = r^u$ there will be no pure-strategy equilibrium.

This is in contrast with what occurs in our benchmark model. In that case, an equilibrium in pure strategies other than the one that generated royalty stacking, $R^u = r_1^u + r_2^u$, could arise because demand was constant when prices were sufficiently low. For this reason, when $R \leq v$ no patent holder had incentives to lower its royalty rate since it would not generate an increase in demand.

In the general case, when demand is strictly decreasing in the price and $L_D$ is sufficiently small, only a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies will exist. Patent holders randomize in a support $[r_i^L, r_i^H]$ and a distribution $F_i(r_i)$ (with density $f_i(r_i)$) for $i = 1, 2$. Patentee 2 when choosing a higher $r_2$ trades off a lower probability of being litigated with a higher payoff when litigation occurs but the firm succeeds in court. This trade-off means that patentee 2 will choose a lower expected royalty rate than when litigation was not a threat. In the case of patentee 1 two effects go in opposite directions. On the one hand, due to Inverse Cournot effect the patent holder has incentives to lower the royalty rate $r_1$ in order to enjoy monopoly profits with a higher probability. On the other hand, there is a probability that the portfolio of the other patent holder is invalidated and, since in that case royalty rates are strategic substitutes, it is optimal to raise $r_1$. Our benchmark model suggests that the first effect is likely to dominate and the royalty rate is likely to be lower when litigation is a relevant threat.
3.2 Litigation Cascades and its Strategic Effects

We now turn to the case in which both patent holders have a portfolio of the same size, with \( g(x_1) = g(x_2) = g(x) < 1 \). In the next lemma we describe the order under which the downstream producer might litigate both patent holders and it validates the order postulated in 2.3.

**Lemma 8.** If the two patent holders have a portfolio of the same strength, the downstream producer always prefers to litigate first the one that has set the highest royalty.

The intuition arises from the combination of two forces operating in the same direction. First, suppose that the outcome of the first court case affects the decision to litigate the other patent holder. Challenging first the portfolio associated to the highest royalty means that this royalty is not paid with probability \( 1 - g(x) \). If instead the other patent holder is litigated first this probability decreases to \( (1 - g(x))^2 \), as the decision depends on the outcome of the first trial. Second, litigating first the patent holder with the highest royalty generates a larger option value. In this particular case, the option value plays out as follows. The higher the royalty rate of a patent holder the more likely it is that litigation pays off both in the case in which the other portfolio is invalidated and when it is not. As a result, it is optimal to face first the patent holder for which litigation is profitable in more states of the world (the one with the highest royalty) and postpone the litigation of the patent holder with the lowest royalty those states of the world in which it is profitable are realized.

The previous result is useful in order to anticipate the changes in the probability that patent holders are litigated as a result of variations in the royalty rate. In particular, we now explore conditions under which a symmetric equilibrium \( r_1^* = r_2^* = r^* \) exists. Because \( \Pi_D \) is a convex function of the total royalty rate, we have that

\[
\Pi_D(r^*) - \Pi_D(2r^*) \leq \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r^*).
\]

This implies that if it is profitable to litigate one of the patent holders it will also be
profitable to litigate the other one upon winning in court. This also means that in a symmetric equilibrium, \( r^* \), litigation against both firms will take place if

\[
(1 - g(x))[\Pi_D(r^*) - \Pi_D(2r^*)] + (1 - g(x)) \{(1 - g(x))[\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(2r^*)] - L_D\} > L_D.
\]

This expression has the same interpretation as (8). Notice that because the downstream producer is indifferent between litigating any patent holder first, the probability that each one eventually faces a trial is \( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}(1 - g(x)) \).

We now characterize the incentives to litigate when patent holder 1 deviates from the symmetric candidate equilibrium. Given \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) and the endogenous ordering that they imply we can define the gains arising from litigation when the second trial is contingent on success in the first one as

\[
\Phi(r_1, r_2) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\Pi_D(r_2) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) + (1 - g(x))[\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_2)] & \text{if } r_1 > r_2, \\
\Pi_D(r) - \Pi_D(2r) + (1 - g(x))[\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r)] & \text{if } r_1 = r_2 = r, \\
\Pi_D(r_1) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) + (1 - g(x))[\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_1)] & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]

The first terms correspond to the increase in profits accruing after the initial trial and the last one is the additional increase due to further litigation. Thus, litigation is profitable if \( (1 - g(x))[\Phi(r_1, r_2) - L_D] > L_D \). From Lemma 8, we know that if \( r_1 > r_2 \) the producer litigates against patentee 1 first. The gains compared to the initial situation \( \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) \) accrue with probability \( 1 - g(x) \). Further litigation occurs in that case. Success against patentee 2, with probability \( 1 - g(x) \), results in profits \( \Pi_D(0) \). If the downstream producer is defeated in court profits become \( \Pi_D(r_2) \). The expression for profits is reversed when \( r_2 > r_1 \).

Consider how these profits change with \( r_1 \). In that case,

\[
\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1} = \begin{cases} 
-\Pi'_D(r_1 + r_2) & \text{if } r_1 \geq r_2, \\
\Pi'_D(r_1) - \Pi'_D(r_1 + r_2) - (1 - g(x))\Pi'_D(r_1) & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]

This implies that increases and decreases of \( r_1 \) around \( r_2 \) have a different effect on the willingness of the downstream producer to litigate. Consider an initial situation in which \( r_1 = r_2 \). As expected, an increase in \( r_1 \) raises the profitability of challenging the portfolio of patentee 1 as the downstream profits without litigation are smaller. Decreases in \( r_1 \)
below \( r_2 \), however, lead to two opposing effects as shown in the previous expression. On
the one hand, the first two terms correspond to the Inverse Cournot effect which implies
that patent holder 2 is more likely to be litigated. On the other hand, litigation against
patent holder 2 makes a litigation cascade less profitable since by lowering \( r_1 \) the expected
gains from trying to invalidate the portfolio of patent holder 1 drop by \((1 - g(x))\Pi_D'(r_1)\).
Hence, the effect of a decrease in \( r_1 \) in the chances that patentee 1 is litigated is in general
ambiguous.

**Example 2.** Under a linear demand function, \( D(p) = 1 - p \) and in a symmetric situation,
the Inverse Cournot effect dominates the litigation cascade and, hence, a decrease in the
royalty rate lowers the returns from litigation of the downstream producer if and only if
\( r > \frac{1-g(x)}{2-g(x)} \). Notice that the unconstrained equilibrium royalty rate is \( r^u_1 = r^u_2 = \frac{1}{3} \).

As opposed to the case of one firm being threatened by litigation, the fact that a
patent holder that chooses a lower royalty might be more likely to face litigation implies
that sometimes a symmetric Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies may exist. The next
proposition characterizes one such case.

**Proposition 9.** With identical patent holders and a linear demand function, in a sym-
metric equilibrium in pure strategies, \( r^*_1 = r^*_2 = r^* \), either \( r^* = r^u \) or \( r^* < r^u \) and it is
defined as

\[
g(x)\Pi_D(r^*) + (1 - g(x))\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(2r^*) = \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)} + L_D.
\]

This last equilibrium arises when \( g(x) \) and \( L_D \) are sufficiently small and \( L_U \geq 0 \). The
equilibrium royalty is increasing in \( g(x) \) and \( L_D \).

In order to discuss the previous result it is useful to consider the possible deviations
of any patent holder. First, only large increases in the royalty rate might compensate the
sure litigation cost \( L_U \) and the ensuing probability that the patent portfolio is invalidated.
When \( g(x) \) is small the costs are likely to dominate the benefits. Second, lowering the
royalty, below $r^*$ implies that the other patentee is litigated first. However, given that $g(x)$ is small, a litigation cascade might affect the deviating patent holder, making the move less profitable. Finally, as discussed in the benchmark case, a significant decrease in the royalty rate is necessary in order to prevent litigation if the downstream producer is successful against patent holder 2. The lower is $L_D$ the lower this royalty rate must be and, again, the less profitable the deviation becomes.

4 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications

This paper, using a very stylized model, suggests that many of the standard results in the case of complementary technologies are not robust to litigation or the threat of its use, which is a prevalent fact in many technological sectors. We have seen that this is the result of two effects. Licensors with weak patent portfolios are unable to charge high royalties due to the threat of litigation; and, due to the Inverse Cournot effect, active licensors with strong patent portfolios have an incentive to limit their royalty demands because that weakens the position of those licensors with weak patent portfolios. Thus, royalty stacking is more likely to be a problem when downstream competition is strong since, in those industries, manufacturers have a limited incentive to litigate and, thus, patent holders are not constrained by the threat of litigation. In the extreme, if the downstream market is perfectly competitive the threat of litigation becomes irrelevant.

The concerns about royalty stacking have been particularly important in the context of Standard Setting Organizations. It has been argued that the owners of patents for those technologies that are essential to implement a standard gain the power to set an excessively high royalty rate. For this reason, SSOs typically require that these patents are licensed according to Fair, Reasonable, and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In interpreting these terms, licensees have sued patent holders claiming that their rates were abusive and in some occasions courts have even determined the FRAND royalty rate.

In the appendix we develop an extension of the model in which we consider this
additional risk that a patent holder faces when setting a royalty rate. As in the rest of the paper, the portfolio might be considered invalid. But, at the same time, the downstream producer might argue that the terms are not FRAND and ask the court to determine a new (and lower) royalty rate. We show that under very mild requirements the condition determining the decision of the downstream producer to litigate a patent holder has the features discussed in Lemma 7 and, thus, the Inverse Cournot Effect would operate in the same way. Interestingly, we also show that some interpretations of the FRAND terms recently put forward by some US courts meant to curb royalty stacking might actually encourage it.

In the context of SSOs, the idea of royalty stacking has also been used to assess the desirability of patent consolidation or disaggregation. The concern about privateers, spin-offs of existing firms aimed at enforcing their intellectual property, and patent assertion entities has been seen, in the light of this theory, as a way to increase the royalty stack. In contrast, consolidation efforts through patent acquisitions or the creation of patent pools should always be encouraged as they contribute to lower the aggregate royalty rate.

In this model, as a result of the assumption that the enforcement is a function of the strength of the patent portfolio, if firms pool their patents they are likely to make enforcement more effective. As we discuss next, this last effect might imply that, contrary to common wisdom, the formation of a patent pool or the merger of two patent holders might make the royalty-stacking problem worse. By the same token, to the extent that disaggregation creates more asymmetric patent holdings, it might be socially beneficial.

To illustrate this point take the following simple example. Consider the case in which originally $N = 3$ patent holders decide independently on their royalty rate and $g(x_1) = 1$ and $g(x_2) = g(x_3) \leq 1$. For simplicity, assume also that $g(x_2 + x_3) = 1$ so that the sum of their portfolios is big enough to guarantee their sure success in court if their patents are consolidated.

Extending the results in the benchmark model, patentees 2 and 3 are more likely to be
restricted when $L_D$ is small, leading to a lower royalty $r_2$ and $r_3$. We also know that when these royalties are sufficiently low, the royalty stacking problem is likely to disappear, as patent holder 1 internalizes all the aggregate gains from a moderate $r_1$.

Consider now the decision of two patent holders to consolidate their portfolios in a patent pool. If this decision involves patentee 1, royalty stacking is less likely to arise. This observation is due to two reasons. First, by definition, the strength of the resulting portfolio does not increase and, therefore, the bargaining power of the downstream producer against the pool is not affected. Second, suppose that the consolidation eliminates patentee 2 as a player. Because the Cournot effect implies that the merged firm will choose a royalty rate lower than $r_1 + r_2$, we have that patentee 3 will be more constrained by the threat of litigation and, due to the Inverse Cournot effect, it will need to decrease $r_3$. As a result of both effects, the large patent holder is likely to internalize a larger proportion of the surplus and, thus, moderate the royalty demands to prevent royalty stacking from emerging. It is important to notice that this consolidation is likely to be profitable for the parties involved precisely because the lower total royalty rate increases total surplus.

The previous positive effects are in opposition to what we find if patent holder 2 and 3 consolidate their portfolios and form a patent pool. Due to our assumptions, this new situation is akin to having two large patent holders and, as we discussed in the main part of the paper, in this situation royalty stacking is more likely to occur. In particular, if $L_D$ is small the total royalty was low before consolidation but, as a result of it, the decrease in the number of patent holders leads to royalty stacking.

The application of the discussion to patent spin-offs suggests that, as long as these firms do not have large patent portfolios and they do not increase the risk of a litigation cascade, they should not have a detrimental effect on welfare since they would encourage large patent holders to lower their rates.
References


A FRAND Commitments

Most SSOs request participating firms to license the patents that are considered essential to the standard according to Fair, Reasonable, and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The ambiguity of this term and the different interpretation of patent holders and licensees has made FRAND a legally contentious issue. Courts have sometimes been asked to decide whether a royalty rate is FRAND or not and in some instances to determine the FRAND rate.

The goal of this section is not to assert whether a royalty is FRAND or not but, rather, to study what is the effect of courts determining it on the previous results and, in particular, on the Inverse Cournot effect. In order to do so, we now extend the basic model and assume that the downstream producer can litigate a patent holder arguing, as before, that the portfolio is invalid and, in case it is not, to ask the court to rule that the patents are essential to the standard and the royalty requested is not FRAND. We assume that the larger is a patent portfolio the more likely it is that the technology it covers is
considered essential to the standard. This probability is defined as \( h(x_i) \), increasing in \( x_i \). We also generalize the previous setup by considering the case of \( N \) firms, where \( R_{-i} \) corresponds to the sum of the royalty rate of all patentees other than \( i \).

If the portfolio is declared to include patents that are essential to the standard the court will determine the appropriate royalty. We assume that this royalty, \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \), is an increasing function of the quality of the patent portfolio, \( x_i \). As we discuss later, we also allow for the possibility that the court’s decision depends on the royalty announced by the patent holder or the total royalty established by the other patent holders.

Following the analysis in the benchmark model, the downstream monopolist will be interested in litigating patentee \( i \) only if

\[
(1 - g(x_i)) \left[ \Pi_D(R_{-i}) - \Pi_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right] + g(x_i) h(x_i) \left[ \Pi_D(R_{-i} + \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i})) - \Pi_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right] > L_D.
\]

The previous expression has a straightforward interpretation. The producer might benefit from litigation either because the patents are invalidated, which occurs with probability \( 1 - g(x_i) \), or because they are considered valid and essential to the standard, with probability \( g(x_i) h(x_i) \). In this latter case, the royalty rate is decreased from \( r_i \) to \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \).

**Lemma 10.** Suppose that \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \) is independent of \( r_i \) and \( R_{-i} \). Then, there exists a unique critical value \( \tilde{r}_i(x_i, R_{-i}, L_D) \) such that the producer prefers to litigate patentee \( i \) if and only if \( r_i > \tilde{r}_i \). Furthermore, this threshold is increasing in \( R_{-i} \) and \( L_D \).

This result indicates that the Inverse Cournot effect is qualitatively unaffected as long as the court determines the FRAND royalty as only a function of the quality of the portfolio. The main difference, however, is that the result does not guarantee that patent holders with a larger portfolio can indeed charge a higher royalty without enticing the producer to litigate. The reason is that although a higher \( x_i \) reduces the probability that the court invalidates the patent portfolio, it also increases the probability that it considers the patents essential and, thus, that the royalty should be decreased from \( r_i \) to
\( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \). This second effect dominates when increases in \( x_i \) have a large impact on \( h(x_i) \) but a small one on \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \).\(^{15}\)

It is plausible, however, that \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \) is increasing in \( r_i \). Our results establish sufficient conditions and they might still hold even if \( \rho \) increases in \( r_i \). An interesting case that it is worth to mention is the following: Suppose that a court would determine the FRAND royalty as a function of \( x_i \) but it will never choose \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \) higher than \( r_i \). It can be shown that the results are preserved in this case.

Finally, there have been instances in which courts have used existing royalties in order to pin down the FRAND royalty rate for a patent portfolio. Interestingly, they have been used in two directions. In some cases, courts have adopted the so-called comparables approach and set the royalty rate according to the rate negotiated for comparable patent portfolios, even in the same standard.\(^{16}\) In those cases increases in \( R_{-i} \) would have a positive effect on \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \) and strengthen the Inverse Cournot effect.

In other cases, and more concretely in the Microsoft v. Motorola case,\(^{17}\) it has been argued that the FRAND royalty rate of a patent holder should be lowered due to the already large royalty stack. This reasoning would make \( \rho(x_i, r_i, R_{-i}) \) non-increasing in \( R_{-i} \). Interestingly, this result would undermine the Inverse Cournot effect and, it might even have the effect of reversing its sign, with self-defeating consequences. Large patent holders would anticipate that by choosing a larger royalty and weaker competitors would be forced to set a lower rate by the court, making worse the royalty-stacking problem that courts were trying to mitigate in the first place.

## B Proofs

The main results of the paper are proved here.

\(^{15}\)It stands to reason that if the latter effect dominated, large patent holders would anticipate it and decide to license some of their patents at a rate of 0 in order to prevent their portfolio being deemed as essential.

\(^{16}\)See Leonard and Lopez (2014) for a discussion of this and other approaches used to determine FRAND royalty rates.

Proof of Lemma 1: Immediate from the fact that when $R = v$ total profits are $v$ whereas under $R = 1$ profits are $\alpha$. \hfill \square

Proof of Proposition 2: Regarding the first case, contingent on selling with probability 1 the sum of royalties must be equal to $v$ or otherwise any patent holder would deviate and increase the royalty rate. Hence, take $r_1^u$ and $r_2^u = v - r_1^u$ and suppose without loss of generality that $r_1^u \geq \frac{v}{2} \geq r_2^u$. The optimal deviation for patentee $i$ is $\hat{r}_i = 1 - r_j^u$ for $j \neq i$ and it would be unprofitable if $v - r_j^u \geq \alpha(1 - r_j^u)$ or $r_j^u \leq \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$. Such a combination of royalties is only possible as long as $\frac{v}{2} \leq r_1^u \leq \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$ or $v \geq \frac{2\alpha}{1 + \alpha}$.

For the second case, take $r_1^u$ and $r_2^u = 1 - r_1^u$ and suppose without loss of generality that $r_1^u \geq \frac{1}{2} \geq r_2^u$. The optimal deviation for patentee $i$ is $\hat{r}_i = v - r_j^u$ for $j \neq i$ if it leads to a positive royalty and it would be unprofitable if $\alpha(1 - r_j^u) \geq v - r_j^u$ or $r_j^u \geq \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$. Such a combination of royalties will be possible as long as $\frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \leq r_2^u \leq \frac{1}{2}$ or $v \leq \frac{1 + \alpha}{2}$.

Finally, notice that $\frac{2\alpha}{1 + \alpha} < \frac{1 + \alpha}{2}$ for all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ so both equilibria can co-exist. \hfill \square

Proof of Proposition 4: Assume towards a contradiction that $\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$ and there exists an equilibrium with $r_1^u + r_2^u = 1$. Notice that $\frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \leq v$ implies $\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < v$, and, from Proposition 2, an equilibrium with royalty stacking requires $r_2^u \geq \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$.

A necessary condition for an equilibrium with royalty stacking to exist is $r_2^u \leq \tilde{r}_2$. Also notice that since $r_2^u = \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$, $r_2^u > r_2^u$.

Thus, assume that $r_2^u < r_2^* \leq \tilde{r}_2$ so that patentee 2 is litigated if patentee 1 deviates and chooses $\hat{r}_1 = \tilde{r}_1(r_2^u)$. Patentee 1’s profits become

$$\hat{\Pi}_1(x_2, r_2^*) = [\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2))][v + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} r_2^* - \frac{L_D}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2))}],$$

strictly decreasing in $x_2$ and $L_D$ and strictly increasing in $r_2^u$. This deviation will be unprofitable if $\hat{\Pi}_1(x_2, r_2^*) \leq \alpha r_1^u = \alpha(1 - r_2^u)$ or, rearranging terms, if

$$r_2^* \leq \tilde{r}_2(x_2, L_D) = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(\alpha - Gv) + G \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)}}{\alpha(G + (1 - \alpha))}$$

where $G = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2)) \in [\alpha, 1]$. This expression can be rewritten as

$$r_2^* \leq \left[1 - \frac{G}{\alpha(G + (1 - \alpha))}\right] vG - \alpha + \frac{G}{\alpha(G + (1 - \alpha))} \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$$

since $\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$ and $\frac{G - \alpha}{G - \alpha}$ is increasing in $G$ for $v \leq 1$. Thus, we reach a contradiction.

Hence, we only need to show that the equilibrium with $R = v$ exists. Consider the case $r_2^u = \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} < \frac{v - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$ and $r_1^u = v - r_2^u$. From (4) $r_2^*$ avoids litigation and by Proposition
2 patentee 1 has no incentive to deviate. Thus, the only deviation we need to consider from patentee 2 is such that \( R > v \). However, notice that
\[
r_1^* = v - \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} = v + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} r_2^* - \frac{L_D}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - g(x_2))} = \bar{r}_1(r_2^*),
\]
and so any higher \( r_2 \) will induce litigation. Hence, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if such a deviation is not profitable
\[
\frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} \geq \alpha g(x_2) \left( 1 - v + \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x_2)} \right) - L_U.
\]
This condition is guaranteed if \( L_U \) is sufficiently high. \( \square \)

**Proof of Lemma 5:** First notice that if patent holder loses in court patent holder 1 will be litigated if and only if
\[
\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(\hat{r}_1) > \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)}
\]
or \( \hat{r}_1 > \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)} \). Also notice that, from the arguments in the text, if originally it was not optimal to engage in litigation it has to be that
\[
\Pi_D(1/2) - \Pi_D(1) \leq \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)}.
\]
Patent holder 1 would be litigated after downstream producer loses against patent holder 2 if
\[
\Pi_D(1/2) - \Pi_D(1/2 + \hat{r}_1) > \frac{L_D}{1 - g(x)}
\]
which is incompatible with the previous condition. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Define \( F(R) \equiv D(p^M(R)) \) so that \( D(p^M(R)) \) is quasiconcave if \( F'(R)^2 \geq F''(R)F(R) \). The optimal royalty of patentee \( i \) is the result of
\[
\max_{r_i} r_i F(R),
\]
with first-order condition
\[
F(R) + r_i^* F'(R) = 0. \implies r_i^* = -\frac{F(R)}{F'(R)}.
\]
Replacing \( r_i^* = r^* = \frac{R^*}{N} \) we can use the Implicit Function Theorem to compute
\[
\frac{dR^*}{dN} = \frac{\frac{R^*}{N} F'(R^*)}{F'(R^*) + \frac{R^*}{N} F'(R^*) + \frac{1}{N} F'(R^*)} \geq 0.
\]
The last inequality arises from a negative numerator due to \( F'(R) \leq 0 \) and a negative denominator that it is also negative due to the quasiconcavity of \( F(R) \). \( \square \)
Proof of Lemma 7: From equation (4) we can see, using the fact that $\Pi'_D(R) < 0$ and $\Pi''_D(R) > 0$, that

$$
\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dL_D} = \frac{1}{\Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1) - \Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1 + r_2)} < 0,
$$

$$
\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dx_2} = \frac{g'(x_2)[\Pi_D(\bar{r}_1) - \Pi_D(\bar{r}_1 + r_2)]}{[\Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1) - \Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1 + r_2)]} < 0,
$$

$$
\frac{d\bar{r}_1}{dr_2} = \frac{\Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1 + r_2)}{\Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1) - \Pi'_D(\bar{r}_1 + r_2)} > 0.
$$

Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose without loss of generality that $r_1 > r_2$. The optimal policy of the downstream producer can be described as arising from the following two stages. In the first stage, it decides whether to litigate patentee 1 or 2 or none at all. Upon observing the outcome of the first trial the patent holder must decide whether to litigate the other patent holder or not.

Suppose that in the first stage patentee $i$ was litigated. Then, if it is optimal for the downstream producer to litigate patentee $j$ upon the defeat it is also optimal to litigate upon victory since, by convexity of $\Pi_D(R)$,

$$
\Pi_D(r_i) - \Pi_D(r_i + r_j) \leq \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_j),
$$

for $i = 1, 2$ and $j \neq i$. Furthermore, notice that

$$
\Pi_D(r_1) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) \leq \Pi_D(r_2) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2),
$$

$$
\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_2) \leq \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_1).
$$

Hence, two possible orderings can arise depending on whether $\Pi_D(r_2) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2)$ is higher or lower than $\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_2)$. In order to determine the profits of the downstream producer in each case, we need to see how these profits compare with $\Lambda \equiv \frac{L_D}{1-g(x)}$.

i Suppose that when 1 is litigated first it is always optimal to litigate 2 afterwards. Obviously, if litigating 1 after the litigation of 2 is also optimal, both options are equivalent and profits are identical.

ii Suppose that when 1 is litigated first it is only optimal to litigate 2 after victory. This implies that $\Pi_D(r_1) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) < \Lambda \leq \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_2)$. Profits are

$$
g(x)[\Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) - L_D] + (1 - g(x))[g(x)\Pi_D(r_2) + (1 - g(x))\Pi_D(0)] - L_D.
$$

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These profits are, by definition, higher than those that arise in the first case. If after litigation of patent holder 2 it is then optimal to litigate firm 1 always, this option would be, therefore, dominated by (i).

Alternatively, it could be that when 2 is litigated first it is only optimal to litigate 1 upon victory. Profits would be in that case,

\[ g(x) [\Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) - L_D] + (1 - g(x)) [g(x)\Pi_D(r_1) + (1 - g(x))\Pi_D(0)] - L_D, \]

which are lower than when 1 is litigated first.

iii Suppose that when 1 is litigated first it is never optimal to litigate 2 afterwards. This implies profits are

\[ g(x)\Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) + (1 - g(x))\Pi_D(r_2) - L_D. \]

If when 2 is litigated first, it is optimal to litigate 1 always, these profits are lower because, as in the previous case, they coincide with profits in the first option. If instead it was optimal to litigate only upon success, again, these profits are dominated by the second option as seen before. Finally, if it is never optimal to litigate firm 1, profits are

\[ g(x)\Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) + (1 - g(x))\Pi_D(r_1) - L_D, \]

which are again lower.

iv Using the same argument, if \( \Lambda \) is sufficiently high so that it is never optimal to litigate 1 only, litigating 2 only must also be dominated.

\[ \square \]

**Proof of Proposition 9:** Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which 1 are 2 constrained. This implies that \( \Phi(r^*, r^*) = \frac{L_D}{1-g(x)} + L_D \). Profits are \( r^*D(p^M(2r^*)) \). It is immediate that \( r^* \) is increasing in \( L_D \) and \( g(x) \).

Three possible deviations of any patent holder, say patentee 1, can come about:

i Patentee 1 might increase its royalty to \( r_1 > r^* \). In that case, Patentee 1 will be litigated first. Profits become \( \max_{r_1} g(x)r_1D(p^M(r_1 + r^*)) - L_U \).

ii Patentee 1 might deviate by lowering the royalty slightly. In this case, the sign of \( \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1} \) becomes relevant. In particular,

\[ \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1}(r_1, r_2) \geq 0 \iff g(x)\Pi_D(r_1) - \Pi_D(r_1 + r_2) = D(p^M(r_1 + r_2)) - g(x)D(p^M(r_1)) \geq 0, \]

39
If $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1} \geq 0$, decreases in $r_1$ reduce the incentives for the downstream firm to litigate. Since royalties are strategic substitutes and $r^*$ is below the unconstrained royalty this strategy can never be optimal.

Alternatively, if $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1} < 0$, a deviation consisting in a slight decrease in $r_1$ induces litigation, first against patentee 2 and, upon success, against patentee 1. This implies that the profits of patentee 1 become

$$g(x) r^* D(p^M(2r^*)) + (1 - g(x)) \left[ g(x) r^* D(p^M(r^*)) - L_U \right],$$

This deviation is unprofitable if

$$r^* D(p^M(2r^*)) - g(x) r^* D(p^M(r^*)) < -L_U,$$

which holds if $L_U$ is sufficiently large, since the left-hand side is negative when $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1}(r^*, r^*) < 0$ which occurs when $r^*$ is large.

iii Finally, patent holder 1 could lower $r_1$ enough so that

$$(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r_A1) \right] \leq L_D.$$ In that case, patent holder 1 would not be litigated. Again, two possibilities can arise here depending on whether the downstream producer is interested in litigating patentee 2 or not. Notice that only if patentee 2 is litigated this deviation might be profitable. Hence, the optimal deviation $\tilde{r}_1 = \min\{r^A_1, r^B_1\}$, where

$$(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(r^A_1) \right] = L_D, \quad (13)$$

and

$$(1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(r^B_1) - \Pi_D(r^* + r^B_1) \right] = L_D. \quad (14)$$

When $r^*$ is sufficiently high the first constraint will be binding. Profits in either case will be

$$g(x) r_1 D(p^M(r^* + \tilde{r}_1)) + (1 - g(x)) r_1 D(p^M(\tilde{r}_1)).$$

When $g(x)$ is sufficiently small it is clear that the first deviation is always dominated since it would imply profits of $-L_U$. The second deviation is also unprofitable since when $g(x) = 0$, $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_1} \geq 0$.

Regarding the last deviation, we know that $\tilde{r}_1 \leq r^B_1$. Under a linear demand when $g(x) = 0$, we have that $\Pi_D(0) - \Pi_D(2r^*) = 2 \left[ \Pi_D(r^B_1) - \Pi_D(r^B_1 + r^*) \right]$ implies $r^B_1 = r^* \frac{1}{2}$. Thus, for the deviation not to be profitable we only require

$$r^* D(p^M(2r^*)) \geq \frac{r^*}{2} D \left( p^M \left( \frac{r^*}{2} \right) \right).$$
When $L_D$ is 0, $r^* = 0$ and the result holds trivially. The derivative of the profit functions evaluated at $r^* = 0$ are $D(p^M(0))$ and $\frac{1}{2} D(p^M(0))$ for the left-hand side and the right-hand side expression, respectively. Thus, the deviation is not profitable when $L_D$ is sufficiently small.

We now show that there is no other symmetric pure strategy equilibrium when the litigation constraint is relevant. First, notice that if $r_1 = r_2$ are lower than $r^*$, each firm has incentives to increase its royalty since their problem is the same as they would face if they were unconstrained and royalties are strategic substitutes. If, instead, $r_1 = r_2 = \tilde{r}$ are higher than $r^*$ each firm obtains profits

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ g(x)\tilde{r}D(p^M(2\tilde{r})) - L_U \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ g(x)\tilde{r}D(p^M(2\tilde{r})) + (1 - g(x)) \left[ g(x)\tilde{r}D(p^M(2\tilde{r})) - L_U \right] \right]$$

where each firm is litigated first with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and the second firm is litigated only if the downstream producer succeeds against the first. Notice that in this case it is always optimal for one firm, say patentee 1, to undercut the other patentee. As a result profits increase to

$$g(x)\tilde{r}D(p^M(2\tilde{r})) + (1 - g(x)) \left[ g(x)\tilde{r}D(p^M(2\tilde{r})) - L_U \right]$$

leading to higher profits. $\square$

**Proof of Lemma 10:** Define

$$\Phi(r, x, L_D, R_{-i}) \equiv (1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi_D(R_{-i}) - \Pi_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right] + g(x)h(x) \left[ \Pi_D(R_{-i} + \rho(x, r_i, R_{-i})) - \Pi_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right] - L_D$$

Obviously, $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial L_D} = -1$. We can also compute

$$\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_i} = -(1 - g(x)) \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + r_i) + g(x)h(x) \left[ \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + \rho(x, r_i, R_{-i})) \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial r_i} - \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right]$$

$$\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial R_{-i}} = (1 - g(x)) \left[ \Pi'_D(R_{-i}) - \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right]$$

$$+ g(x)h(x) \left[ \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + \rho(x, r_i, R_{-i})) \left( 1 + \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial R_{-i}} \right) - \Pi'_D(R_{-i} + r_i) \right]$$

Given that $\Pi_D$ is convex, $\rho(x, r_i, R_{-i}) \leq r_i$ and the assumption that $\rho(x, r_i, R_{-i})$ is independent of $r_i$ and $R_{-i}$ we can show that $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial r_i} \geq 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial R_{-i}} \leq 0$. $\square$