

1. Choice Under Uncertainty (MGW 6.A-D)

- Expected Utility Theory
- Risk and Risk Aversion
- Stochastic Dominance
- Portfolio Selection

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2. Games of Incomplete Information (G 3-4.1 and 4.3.C; MGW 8.E and 9.C)

- Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
- Dynamic Bayesian Games and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Reputation

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3. Adverse Selection, Signaling and Screening (G 4.2; MGW 13.A-D)

- The Akerlof-Wilson model
- Signaling Games
- Spence's Model of Job Market Signaling
- Competitive Screening
- Monopolist Screening

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4. Moral Hazard and Incentives (MGW 14.A-D)

- The Basic Principal-Agent Model
- Dynamic Moral Hazard
- Moral Hazard in Teams
- Incomplete Contracts

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5. Mechanism Design (MGW 23)

- Bayesian Games with Communication
- The Revelation Principle
- Application to Auctions

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