



The Design of Efficient Legal Rules and Institutions

November 14, 2025

CEMFI

8:45 Registration

9:00 Panel Session: Economic Evidence in Court

- William E. Kovacic (George Washington University)
- Adriani Kalintiri (King's College London)
- Jorge Padilla (Compass Lexecon)

10:30 Coffee Break

11:00 Session 1: Judicial Mechanism Design

- Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University) "[The Economic Case for Probability-Based Sentencing](#)" (with Ron Siegel).
Discussant: Danielle Condoirelli (University of Warwick).
- Deniz Kattwinkel (University College London) "[Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Juries: Acquitting the Guilty](#)" (with Alexander Winter).
Discussant: Ángel Hernando-Veciana (UC3M).
- Samuel Kapon (Berkeley Hass) "[Persuading Cartelists to Confess](#)."
Discussant: Marco Serena (CUNEF).

13:30 Lunch

14:30 Session 2: Law and Economics

- Alessandro Ispano (Paris Dauphine) "[The Selective Disclosure of Evidence: An Experiment](#)" (with Agata Farina, Guillaume R. Frechette, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Jacopo Perego).
Discussant: Rosa Ferrer (UPF and BSE).

- Scott Baker (Washington University in St. Louis) “An Information-Based Account of Judicial Independence” (with Claudio Mezzetti).
Discussant: Pablo Ruiz-Verdú (UC3M).

17:00 Farewell

Organizers: Guillermo Caruana, Daniele Condorelli, Gerard Llobet, Jorge Padilla, and Salvatore Piccolo.

CEMFI acknowledges support from Fundación Jorge Padilla, and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, Grant PID2024-160785NB-I00

